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Abstract
News and public affairs on commercial radio dramatically changed following the
1996 Telecom Act, with rapid consolidation and economic efficiencies radically
shrinking commercial radio’s role in the provision of political information. By examining
jobs data, public files, and the views of broadcast journalists, this project assesses the
Act’s impact through the lens of civic-minded Portland, Oregon. Because political
information enables democracy, and because of radio’s uniquely accessible qualities, this
paper argues that market emphasis in media policy—especially in the Act’s absolute
manifestation—has diminished a significant channel of public discourse. Noticing radio’s
democratic potential, still relevant in the digital age, this work offers support for a revival
of discursive opportunities on local commercial radio.
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Part I. Introduction
Because media provide our world-view, they have profound power to shape
public opinion and to influence laws we give to ourselves. Relinquishing control of such
consequential forces, leaving them to chance (whatever the market decides), risks
abandonment of an important democratic goal: an informed, engaged citizenry. Since the
early 1980s, local radio news/public affairs—a once-vibrant source of citizen information
and engagement—has declined at the hands of market forces, culminating with passage
of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.1 This paper asks: What were the Act’s
consequences for radio news/public affairs in Portland, OR, and why do they matter?
Through the lens of commercial radio in Portland,2 I will argue that the Act led to
three dubious effects that truncated democratic opportunities for local radio listeners.
First, rapid post-Act consolidation placed many owners hundreds or thousands of miles
away from communities, distancing them from local concerns. Second, by incentivizing
broadcast news layoffs, Act-enabled economies of scale effectively transferred many
journalistic judgments from local to centralized operations—or eliminated them
altogether. Finally, local news/public affairs, already weakened by years of deregulation,
further eroded or collapsed—shrinking radio opportunities for citizen engagement and
diminishing local radio’s political role.
To indicate the significance of what the Telecom Act has wrought, its harm to
democracy, this paper rests on three underlying premises which I am obliged to support:
that political information is vital to democratic opportunities (in part II), that radio can
make a unique (that is, non-substitutable) contribution to such opportunities (in part III),
and that the Act—not something else—led to the described injury to radio news/public
1

affairs (in part IV). To begin, then, part II establishes the first of these assertions—that
democratic opportunities depend on political information.
Drawing from journalism, communications, and political theory, I define
news/public affairs and sketch the political functions of broadcast journalism that inhere
in democracy. Generally, these are: to facilitate politics (by conveying information
between citizens and government), to call attention to important issues (agenda-setting),
and to offer a forum for public discourse. Because of its progressive political innovations,
Portland, my case study, is a fertile subject for research into radio’s political role. Thus, I
briefly describe Portland’s robust civic activism, and conclude part II with a summary of
the pertinent (Act-related) literature—which informed the Portland project.
To appreciate radio’s political role as a mediator of the public sphere—its unique
provision of democratic opportunities, my second underlying premise—I offer in part III
a summary of related historical, doctrinal, and regulatory events. Throughout broadcast
history, U.S. Supreme Court rulings have fed the rationale for media policy, with
nuanced interpretations of the First Amendment (marketplace of ideas, watchdog, selfrealization, public deliberation). However, the rising influence of economic forces in
media policy increasingly subordinated those regulatory rationales to the economic
marketplace.
Foreshadowing implementation of the Telecom Act, this chapter marks the
transition from the (regulated) “trustee” model to the (less-regulated) “market” model in
radio policy. Although both models purport to serve the public interest, and each has
appealing features, so, too, is each model flawed, as I will detail. However, I find that the
market model—by imposing an economic frame on a public good—seriously undermines
2

political discourse, an effect heightened by the Telecom Act. Valuing only outcomes
expressed as economic “preferences,” the market model disregards the local duties of
broadcasters and squanders the unique (and still relevant) democratic potential of local
radio. In this section I discuss radio’s extraordinary accessibility (affordability,
timeliness, ubiquity) and refute the contention that new media options such as the Internet
make ownership concerns, and radio itself, obsolete.
To defend my claim that, by dissociating many owners from their communities of
license and jettisoning journalism jobs, the Telecom Act impaired local radio news/public
affairs, I looked into station ownership, jobs data, and programming content before and
after the Act. If local patterns were similar to national trends, I expected local effects
would likely be comparable: Distant owners, employing fewer local journalists, would
have had less engagement with listeners, curtailing democratic opportunities via
commercial radio. At both the national and local level, the post-Act period is
characterized by a notable shift in listenership from commercial to non-commercial radio,
implying inadequate provision of political information by commercial radio.3 To further
establish my thesis, that the Act diminished local news/public affairs to anti-democratic
effect, I reviewed stations’ public files and surveyed broadcast news professionals. What
I found comprises part IV.
During 30 years in broadcasting, mostly in Portland radio news, I observed
firsthand the decline in news/public affairs, particularly sharp in the aftermath of the Act.
Although drastically curtailing radio’s political role, the shift in program content (away
from local news/public affairs) took place without public discussion or democratic
approval—despite public ownership of the airwaves. This paper offers support for a
3

return to pre-Telecom Act ownership limits, expanded institutional support for political
discourse, and the placement of radio spectrum policy on the public agenda.
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Part II. Purpose of the Paper, Research Question, Literature, Methods
There have been great societies that did not use the wheel,
but there have been no societies that did not tell stories.
Ursula K. LeGuin

A. Purpose of the Paper
Listeners tuning in the radio in Portland, Oregon, heard something new in the
waning years of the twentieth century: the same content broadcast in thousands of other
American cities. Instead of music and news they were used to, listeners received tailored,
tested formats with less community information, and music often chosen by distant
owners rather than by local disc jockeys. What listeners heard was the product of the
market model, a laissez-faire approach to broadcasting that leaves content to listener
“preferences” rather than to any design aimed at social goals.
By the time the market model—launched during the Reagan era—reached its
apex in 1996, local news/public affairs was already in decline on commercial radio, the
victim of more than a decade of undoing broadcasters’ traditional fiduciary obligations
(deregulation), and competitive challenges from new digital technology (e.g. CDs and
portable listening devices).4 The Telecom Act of 1996 distinctly exacerbated that trend,
impairing or extinguishing local news/public affairs on many stations nationwide. Does
the atrophy of substantial local informational content on commercial radio matter,
especially in the Internet era?
The purpose of this paper is to describe the loss of local informational (especially
political) radio programming—and to suggest that it matters, perhaps in profound ways
that have been insufficiently considered. Through the lens of Portland commercial radio,
this work argues that market emphasis in media policy, notably in its extreme application,
the Telecom Act, has diminished a vital democratic link between citizens and public life.
5

By degrading or eliminating local news/public affairs (including public service
announcements), the Act curtailed local radio’s political role: facilitating
citizen/government communications, agenda-setting, and offering a publicity platform for
local individuals and groups to express their concerns. To make my case that the Act’s
consequences have had specifically political implications, I need to show that democratic
opportunities depend on the kind of information conveyed by local news/public affairs.
Thus I begin by defining news/public affairs.
1. What is news/public affairs?
Although tension reigns over what precisely the press (including electronic
channels) should deliver in a democracy, theorists generally agree the media ought to
publicize information of public interest on a regular basis. Throughout much of the
twentieth century, this normative expectation evolved into a set of routines and practices
institutionalized by professional journalism, purportedly informed by political theory, and
widely accepted by the public as news and public affairs. I merge them here into
news/public affairs since, for purposes of this analysis, they serve the same theoretical
function. Although a greater sense of timeliness (“This just in…”) attends the traditional
journalistic account of news compared with public affairs, both can contribute to
democratic communication: by linking individuals with their representatives and their
communities, placing events in a context, and offering a discussion forum for “the issues
which bear upon our common life” (Meiklejohn [1948] 1960, 75).
Defining news/public affairs is at once deceptively simple and impossibly
complex, since it can mean almost anything: “information not previously known to
someone,” traced to Latin, nova, “new things.”5 As Associated Press leader Melville
6

Stone ([1914] 2011) put it, the news should be “…a truthful, unbiased report of the
world’s happenings…” Lippmann (1922) employed a metaphor from horticulture to
explain it:
The news does not tell you how the seed is germinating in the ground, but
it may tell you when the first sprout breaks through the surface. It may
even tell you what somebody says is happening to the seed under
ground…[or] that the sprout did not come up at the time it was expected.
The more points, then, at which any happening can be fixed, objectified,
measured, named, the more points there are at which news can occur…(in
Graber 2007, 48)
Without context (seeing the news item’s relation to social consequences) events are
empty occurrences (Dewey [1927] 1988, 180). Thus professional journalism infuses news
“values” with measuring devices—impact, proximity, timeliness, and so on—to gauge
“newsworthiness” (Lanson and Stephens 2008, 11). But, a formulaic approach fails to
fully capture what compels a “story.”
Anthropologists and historians have found a remarkable consistency over time in
the human tendency to share their stories (Stephens 1988). Perhaps this is because, as
sociologists suggest, knowledge of events beyond one’s personal experience leads to a
sense of security, control and confidence (Molotch and Lester 1974). “From the most
isolated tribal societies in Africa to the most distant islands in the Pacific, people shared
essentially the same definition of what is news.” Bonds are formed and characters are
judged on the basis of “whether someone reacts to information the same way we do”
(Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007, 9).
Part gossip, part folk tale, news can be “hard” or serious, as in a police story,
“action-centred” (Breed 1956 in McQuail 2000, 338); or, it can be “soft,” with “human
interest” content, a contrast more dependent on the presenter’s attitude than any intrinsic
7

quality (Hughes 1940 in McQuail 2000, 339). Traditional hard news stories comprise
myriad topics in these broad categories: government, military, domestic affairs, and
foreign affairs (Pew 1998). Because of its ambiguity, news/public affairs often has been
framed in terms of journalistic duties or processes—practices formalized in the midtwentieth century. Hence, to pin down the meaning of news/public affairs for this paper,
especially in terms of its significance to democracy, I outline what traditional journalism
expects of its professionals. As we will see, a large gap has developed between those
expectations and contemporary practice.
a. Socially Responsible Media
The first influential articulation of mainstream journalistic duties issued from an
assemblage of distinguished legal, scholarly, and philosophic minds of the World War II
era. Noting that agencies of mass communication, increasingly consolidated, were
“probably the most powerful single influence [of the day],” the so-called Hutchins
Commission declared, the press was obliged to provide:
1. A truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s events in a
context which gives them meaning
2. A forum for the exchange of comment and criticism
3. A means of projecting the opinions and attitudes of the groups in society to
one another (representative picture of the constituents groups)
4. A method of presenting and clarifying the goals and values of the society
5. A way of reaching every member of society by the currents of information
(Leigh [1947] 1974, 20-9)
Although flogged from the right as a threat to prevailing media libertarianism, and from
the left as an empty chastisement of hegemonic media interests, the report laid the
foundation for mainstream journalism values that endured for half a century (Pickard
2010).
8

Peterson (1956) embellished the Commission’s framework. While nodding to
economic and entertainment roles for the media, Peterson saw the social responsibility
model indebted foremost to political service through provision of “information,
discussion, and debate on public affairs…” (in Siebert, Schramm, and Peterson 1956, 74).
And, mid-century professional journalism schools codified the link between press
freedom and social responsibility, emphasizing such almost-mythic standards as
“objectivity,” “fairness,” “balance,” and “accuracy,” that were benchmarks of
“nonpurposive communicators” (reporters) with “no ax to grind” and thus no reason to
“report the facts other than as they are” (Izard, Culbertson, and Lambert 1973, 3, 186).
But, altered institutional routines and practices—a response to economic, technological,
and cultural developments of the 1980s—made the content of news/public affairs more
elusive (Kovach, Rosenstiel, and Mitchell 1999).
As the public interest obligations of broadcasters were lifted by Reagan-era
deregulation (a subject I take up in more detail in part III), certain institutional lines
began to blur. For example, business executives rather than journalists were increasingly
put in charge of news divisions; market imperatives trumped public interest imperatives;
serious news gave ground to a blend of news and entertainment: “infotainment” (Croteau
and Hoynes 2006, 167). Many journalists by the 1990s felt trapped in a downward spiral,
with economic pressures leading to lower quality stories that increasingly alienated
audiences (Kovatch, Rosenstiel, and Mitchell 1999). Moreover, the public increasingly
blamed media entities for the corrosive quality of public discourse (Americans 1995;
Cappella and Jamieson 1996; Fallows 1996; Pauly 1999).
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After its late-century metamorphosis spawned by these developments, a
drastically weakened traditional journalism remained, chastened and rededicated to its
principles. 6 Journalism educators denounced the disparity between democratic ideals
intended to animate the American media system (e.g. government watchdog, marketplace
of ideas, etc.) and existing media structures. As Gurevitch and Blumler (1993) outlined,
press duties were distinctly political:
1. Surveillance of the sociopolitical environment, reporting developments
likely to impinge, positively or negatively, on the welfare of citizens
2. Meaningful agenda-setting, identifying the key issues of the day, including
the forces that have formed and may resolve them
3. Platforms for an intelligible and illuminating advocacy by politicians and
spokespersons of other causes and interest groups
4. Dialogue across a diverse range of views, as well as between power
holders (actual and prospective) and mass publics
5. Mechanisms for holding officials to account for how they have exercised
power
6. Incentives for citizens to learn, choose, and become involved, rather than
merely to follow and kibitz over the political process
7. A principled resistance to the efforts of forces outside the media to subvert
their independence, integrity, and ability to serve the audience
8. A sense of respect for the audience member, as potentially concerned and
able to make sense of his or her political environment (Gurevitch and
Blumler 1993, 270)
But, the authors saw news/public affairs increasingly squeezed out by “a web” of
economic, political and cultural pressures: a media landscape whose “flows” were
bounded economically by the imperatives of capitalism and a consumer society
(Gurevitch and Blumler 1990, 269). Their observation that “entertaining and arresting”
programming increasingly supplanted public affairs was confirmed by Pew researchers in
1998: “There has been a shift toward lifestyle, celebrity, entertainment and celebrity
crime/scandal in the news…” (Pew 1998).
10

Other more recent, similarly traditional approaches mildly revise but essentially
reissue the same long-held journalistic tenets with a new patina. Kovach and Rosenstiel,
for example, channel Hutchins Commission principles (accuracy, provision of a public
forum) and echo Gurevitch and Blumler (emphasis on the watchdog function). But,
uniquely, they share the burden of political information with the public (item 10).
1. Journalism's first obligation is to the truth.
2. Its first loyalty is to citizens.
3. Its essence is a discipline of verification.
4. Its practitioners must maintain an independence from those they cover.
5. It must serve as an independent monitor of power.
6. It must provide a forum for public criticism and compromise.
7. It must strive to make the significant interesting and relevant.
8. It must keep the news comprehensive and proportional.
9. Its practitioners must be allowed to exercise their personal conscience.
10. Citizens, as well as journalists, bear many of the same rights and
responsibilities. (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007, 12)7
Many of the same social responsibility principles are also found in the ethics statements
of professional journalism organizations (e.g. Radio Television Digital News
Association; Society of Professional Journalists).8 And, the “public (or civic)
journalism” movement of the 1990s offers similar fare, but emphasizes a bottom-up
approach—more reliance on citizens, less on officials (Pauly 1999).
Unfortunately, the distance between these proclamations of democratic
commitments and current broadcast content, especially on commercial radio, indicate
market failure at best (Baker 2002a), and propaganda at worst (Herman and Chomsky
2002). Competitive market forces combine to discourage thoughtful news/public affairs
production, a trend exacerbated by conglomeration. (Because corporate conglomerate
owners squeeze out much higher rates of return, the presently dominant bottom-line
objective in media sectors, market forces push toward “cashing out” profits rather than
11

using them to subsidize quality journalism (Baker 2002a, 880).) And, since their careers
depend on harmony with political and corporate elites, journalists conform, if
unconsciously, to establishment ideology (Herman and Chomsky 2002).
b. Nontraditional News/Public Affairs Forms
Dissatisfaction with traditional journalism has fueled creative forms of discursive
engagement, personified by broadcasters/satirists Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert.9 In a
“neomodern” inversion of news and entertainment that serves a number of traditional
journalism functions, Stewart and Colbert lampoon both politicians and the journalists
who have abandoned serious coverage of them (Baym 2010). Holding power to account
by shining his media spotlight on a filibustered 9/11 aid bill, for example, Stewart’s
“advocacy journalism” was likened to that of Murrow and Cronkite (Carter and Stelter
2010).10 And, Colbert’s “new language of public affairs” is often a subversive critique of
the political use of language (Baym 2010).
Nearly one-third of Americans under age 40 said that satirical programs such as
The Daily Show and The Colbert Report were more informative than traditional news,
and helped shape their political views (Rasmussen 2009). And, Stewart’s Daily Show,
which began as a news spoof (1999), has become a “provocative and substantive source
of news” (Kakutani 2008), which rivals mainstream networks as an important and trusted
source of news (Time Polls 2009).11 Although college students who watched The Daily
Show had less trust in the president, the news media, and the political process
(Baumgartner and Morris 2006), apolitical audience members said they paid more
attention to issues they previously ignored (Cao 2010). Though Stewart conflates fact and
fantasy (and disregards much of what traditionalists consider news) analysts admit his
12

program encourages Americans to “think critically about the public square” (Pew Study
2008). Stewart and Colbert viewers scored in the highest percentile in an inquiry into
public affairs knowledge (Pew Study 2007).12
None of this suggests Stewart/Colbert-style “discursive integration” (to use
Baum’s term) is an adequate substitute for traditional journalism; it is mentioned here to
indicate the unbounded nature of news/public affairs. Nor is it entirely new. Consider
decades of Saturday Night Live (and, earlier, All in the Family), cartoons such as
Doonesbury (and, earlier, Pogo and Li’l Abner), comics like George Carlin (and, earlier,
Lenny Bruce and Mort Sahl). Arguably, they and innumerable others dating back to
Horace and Juvenile deployed a satirical version of news/public affairs which address at
least some democratic functions long expected of the press—especially holding officials
accountable and directing attention to important issues (Baym 2010).
In short, because there is no pat definition for news/public affairs it may best be
characterized by its intended functions in democracy. Professional journalism described
certain press responsibilities meant to drive news/public affairs content: providing
accurate, adequate information, in a context that highlights key issues; disseminating
knowledge; furnishing a forum for public discourse, including contrary viewpoints; and
supervising powerful officials. Due to a range of pressures, however—economic,
technological, and cultural—many of these ideal duties have attenuated over time,
leading both to a crisis in journalism and to innovative forms of news/public affairs. With
that in mind, I turn to its importance in a self-governing society.
2. Why is News/Public Affairs Important to Democracy?
Because they provide citizens with a means of informing themselves and
13

expressing political will, media reign over the public sphere. (I will say more about this
historical role for the press in part III.) According to democratic theory, this mediation
ideally consists of facilitating politics by channeling information to and from citizens,
their representatives, and their communities. Since such political information has the
power to influence citizens’ freedom and equality—the twin promises of liberalism (Carr
2010)—it is the oxygen of democracy.
An informed citizenry is essential in any but the most farcical democracy
(Madison [1822] 1953). It follows that citizens must have the degree of political
information that enables their participation in the governing process (Schudson 2002). In
a liberal pluralist democracy such as the U.S., that means enough information to
understand and argue for their interests (Dahl 1989; Delli Carpini 2000; Schattschneider
[1960] 2008). But if democracy prevails only to the extent that citizens’ interests are
equally taken into account, something more than information flow is implied: It suggests
the channels of communication should be closely linked to communities, assessing their
needs, and offering platforms for diverse—even unpopular—voices. How else to take the
interests of citizens equally into account?
Absent such communication, neither officials nor citizens can effectively perform
their theoretical role in the process of self-governance. Officials, without the ability to
receive public opinion, would fall short in their (constitutionally presumed) obligation to
represent constituents in policy promulgation. And, citizens, unable to obtain and respond
to relevant issue information, would thus have their voices (unconstitutionally) removed
from the policymaking process. Although not limited by form, as the Stewart/Colbert
example demonstrated, provision of political information is the core democratic function
14

of media in a self-governing society. The vehicle for that content, news/public affairs,
performs several specific functions so familiar they need only a brief review.
a. Holding Officials Accountable
The watchdog press function (which I explore in part III, the Public Sphere/First
Amendment) has been, since the Enlightenment, a security against corrupt government
(Mill [1859] 1998). “The press it is whose ever watchful eye exposes the secret
motivations of politics and forces men in public life to appear one by one before the court
of public opinion” (Tocqueville [1835-40] 2003, 217). However, the press role as a check
on government power is seriously weakened when its goals align with officials (Bennett,
Lawrence, and Livingston 2008; Cook 2005a), or when market forces place it in the
service of corporate power (Coronel 2008; Herman and Chomsky 2002).
In a disturbing recent example, researchers linked misperceptions about events
surrounding the Iraq War (2003) to citizens’ choice of news outlets. Kull, Ramsey, and
Lewis (2003) found significant correlations between ignorance of certain facts (for
example, whether weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq) and respondents’
loyalty to specific news providers. This is of concern if media gatekeepers are, in a
democracy, expected to keep the public informed about important policy matters.
b. Providing a Platform for Public Discourse
Guarding the freedom of public discussion, as Meiklejohn described it, was the
first step in “the unending attempt of our nation to be intelligent about its own purposes.”
By communicating freely about the “values, the opportunities, the difficulties, the joys
and sorrows, the hopes, and fears, the plans and purposes of that common life,”
Americans become a “community of mutual understanding” (Meiklejohn [1948] 1960,
15

87). Tocqueville found (1835) America so spread out that newspapers crucially offered
citizens a way to “speak to each other without seeing each other,” in order to share
proposals for joint action, and reach common understandings without actually meeting
(Tocqueville [1835-40] 2003, 217).
Dewey saw that communication alone could create a great community—in a
country whose size and industrialization had distanced citizens from their government
and each other. But, the U.S. did not need random sensationalized bits of trivialized news
produced by powerful and interested parties. Public information needed institutional
development in the manner of a “genuine social science…contemporary and quotidian,”
meaning daily, regularized (Dewey [1927] 1988, 180). Over-institutionalization, though,
when journalism has “internalized” the ideology of market emphasis, risks the loss of
independent or critical perspectives (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 306).
c. Spreading Knowledge
“Rays of human ability do not radiate from one central point,” Tocqueville
declared. Thus he saw the proliferation of newspapers (where there were “no licenses for
printers, no stamps or registration”) as crucial distributors of intelligence (Tocqueville
[1835-40] 2003, 214). Dewey called dissemination of information, or the lack of it, the
problem of the public. Matters of public life required “inquiry into facts.” Not everyone
needed to have expert knowledge, he suggested, but through effective communication
anyone could learn enough to “judge the bearing of the knowledge supplied by others
upon common concerns” (Dewey [1927] 1988, 125, 208). Fortunately, as Dahl pointed
out, telecommunications made it possible for “virtually every citizen [to] have
information about public issues almost immediately accessible…” (Dahl 1989, 339).
16

Democracy itself depended on “educating and informing” citizens such that they were
“able to think and act as self-governing citizens” (Meiklejohn [1948] 1960, 86).
d. Airing Diverse Views
Because it is seminal to democratic theory, fostering free thought is a key media
responsibility (Mill [1859] 1998, 20). Social and intellectual uniformity leads to
mediocrity (Dewey [1927] 1988, 115). And, since average citizens necessarily rely on
experts for information, "prospects for democracy hinge upon the diversity of views
among policy specialists and the relative weakness of their common interests as a
class” (Dahl 1989, 339). So crucial to self-governance is wide-ranging public discussion
that no information may be suppressed, including “opinion, doubt, belief, counterbelief,
no relevant information may be kept from [citizens]” (Meiklejohn [1948] 1960, 74-75).
The media obligation to a marketplace of ideas is central to First Amendment doctrine,
which I summarize in the Public Sphere/First Amendment section of part III. For now, it
is enough to note that “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate is implicit in the
special constitutional protection that attends speech freedom in the U.S.13
e. Publicizing Local Concerns
Because American citizens make decisions about community resources at the
local level, media are responsible for publicizing the ideas, needs, and concerns of
residents near them. (Localism is the rationale behind much broadcast policy; see part III,
Radio Regulation.) From sanitation to housing, transportation to taxes, Dewey found that
without adequate information about local affairs, the public was “eclipsed,” too confused
to participate effectively in self-governance. “[P]articipation in activities and sharing in
results…demand communication as a prerequisite” (Dewey [1927] 1988, 152, his
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emphasis). Moreover, because “human interests are in constant conflict, and cannot all be
realized,” decisions about community resources (e.g. parks, libraries, schools, soil
conservation) rely upon information—so that judgments may be made as to “relative
values and mutual implications” (Meiklejohn [1948] 1960, 81).
Since the distribution of societal goods—“who gets what, when, and how”14 in
terms of “goods, services, and values” from government15—depends on the ability of
individuals and groups to identify and express their interests, the publicity function is
integral to democracy. According to this view, a media entity, by publicizing certain
information (or not), may influence the fortunes of some one or some thing. Herein lies
the heart of press power.
Thus media shape the very character of communities, playing a crucial role in
local projects—that realm of public life where citizens associate and contemplate their
common future, eluding the isolating effects of individualism (Tocqueville [1835-40]
2003). This “wild complex” of organizations and movements provides a “context of
discovery” where citizens’ needs, experiences, and identities are shared (Habermas 2004,
307). Ideally, the formal public sphere—comprised of deliberative bodies—takes
legislative cues from the problems (and possible solutions) that flow from this informal
public sphere. But, as is well documented, whether officials pay attention to citizen
concerns rests in great part with the media (Rogers and Dearing, in Doris Graber 2007,
81; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982, 849).
My aim in this section has been to establish the first necessary premise for this
paper: that democratic opportunities depend on political information. Since Lasswell’s
first statement (1948) of societal functions performed by communications—surveillance
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of the environment, correlation of societal segments in response to the environment, and
transmission of cultural heritage—scholars have reaffirmed that political information is
the key to self-governance. Its absence or distortion can have disruptive or harmful
consequences (in McQuail 2000). Whether assenting to the leadership of elites or actively
engaging in civic affairs, political information enables citizen participation (Schudson
2002).
Especially in a pluralist system, in which individuals and groups vie for a share of
societal goods, information (adequate to understanding and lobbying for one’s own
interest) can determine welfare (Delli Carpini 2000, Schattschneider [1960] 2008).
Cooperation in joint community projects, judgments about shared resources, holding
officials to account—all rest on access to information (Dewey [1927] 1988; Meiklejohn
[1948] 1960; Tocqueville [1835-1840] 2003). So inseparable is political information
from a republic that the founders privileged the press with extraordinary protection in the
First Amendment.
3. Why Portland?
Among the social responsibilities of the press, this paper is particularly interested
in publicity for local concerns. Zooming in on this function in Portland, my case study
looks into the consequences of market-driven media—particularly after the Telecom Act.
Research is needed into Portland commercial radio for at least three reasons relevant
here: its potentially high demand for political information; signs that demand is unmet (or
poorly met); and, local broadcasters’ concerns that they are unable to fulfill radio’s
political role.
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Renowned for its public spirit and unique political practices, Portland has
demonstrated an appetite for political information. Certainly, with proliferating digital
options, information is more available than ever before. But, amid market constraints,
serious journalism is increasingly ostracized from mainstream channels, leaving many
local radio journalists unable to perform their key political functions: conveying political
information, directing attention to important issues, offering a discourse platform.
Although the diminishment of news/public affairs has been documented in research into
Portland television (Higgins 2005), I have found no such studies on Portland radio—a
void this paper seeks to address.
With its populous, liberal electorate Portland has long driven the innovative
politics of Oregon—home to the nation’s first container-deposit law (“the bottle bill”),
one-of-a-kind vote-by-mail system, hyperactive initiative and referendum process, and
maverick health plan.16 Long known for land-use planning that emphasized farmland
preservation and vertical development, the Portland area is in the vanguard of the “green”
movement. It ranks with the most bicycle-friendly cities in the world, and recently
installed electric vehicle charging stations in multiple locations.17 An extensive network
of neighborhood associations, a volunteerist ethic, and grassroots activism suggest a
robust agenda for public discourse—which, ideally, would be supported by prevalent
political information (Sussman and Estes 2004, 136).
However, during the late 1980s and early 1990s in Portland (as elsewhere) civic
discourse corroded, with public engagement increasingly characterized by conflict.
Although participation in civic associations continued to grow in Portland, bucking a
national decline (Putnam, Feldstein, and Cohen, 2003, 243), activists were more often
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rising to challenge collective projects. In contrast to the 1970s, one news content analysis
found, two-thirds of 1990s news stories about Portland-area neighborhoods were negative
(Johnson 2004, 112). Around this period, Portlanders were shifting their attention away
from commercial radio.
Even as newspaper circulation declined, along with network TV news audiences,
non-commercial radio greatly expanded its listenership nationwide at the turn of the
twenty-first century (Kamenetz 2009; Powers 2003). The decline of news/public affairs
on commercial stations may have been a prime reason (Meyer, in Kamenetz 2009).
Similarly, while listenership on many of Portland’s commercial radio stations dropped
during the same period, the city’s major non-commercial station, (political informationrich) KOPB, significantly increased its audience share in the post-Telecom Act period. At
the precise historical moment when commercial stations were shrinking news/public
affairs, KOPB’s market ranking rose dramatically—from around tenth place in the late
1990s, to consistently first or second in 2001 and thereafter (see Appendix L).
Public radio listeners, from market to market, are consistent in what they seek
when they tune in public radio: depth, intelligence, authenticity, civility, and a global
perspective (Sense of Place 2006). Hence it is reasonable to suspect some Portland
listeners departed commercial radio in search of political information. If true it may
indicate local commercial stations were not meeting, or were poorly meeting, the
informational needs of communities they were licensed to serve (their historical fiduciary
obligation).
The final impetus for an examination of Portland commercial radio is the concern
of broadcasters themselves. As indicated in the Radio Survey 2011, a component of this
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research project, strong majorities of local broadcast journalists responding felt
commercial stations had reduced their news/public affairs content “in recent years,”
believed “not enough” was currently provided, and found that journalists’ “ability to
communicate important news subjects” to their listeners was “limited in the current
media environment” (Appendix F, questions 4, 5, and 14). Combined, Portland’s active,
innovative political culture, along with signs that local commercial radio may
inadequately provide political information, and the concerns of broadcast journalists
make the Portland radio scene ripe for academic study.
B. The Research Question
This study examines the degree to which consequences of the Telecom Act
(consolidation, lost jobs, and diminished news/public affairs) can be demonstrated in
Portland commercial radio. Comparing the traditional provision of local news/public
affairs with what remained following the Act, I link the Act with lost democratic
opportunities. Thus, simply stated, my research question was: What impact did the 1996
Telecom Act have on radio news/public affairs in Portland, OR, and why does it matter?
To consider what has already been studied in other media and other markets, I turn to the
relevant literature.
C. The Literature
Many scholars have examined post-Act radio ownership concentration, but few
have documented the Act’s impact to radio news/public affairs nor zeroed in on particular
markets. While more than 90 percent of Americans listen to the radio (Radio Today
2010), I could find only one study that specifically analyzed local radio news content
after the Act.18 Conclusions from the relevant literature fall roughly into three broad
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claims: that the Act’s dramatic lifting of ownership limits led to voracious consolidation
that created radio giants, often distancing owners from their communities; that throngs of
broadcast journalism jobs were eliminated; and that station programming lost its local
flavor and much (in some cases all) of its news/public affairs. (You may wonder how, if
such content has been severely understudied, this third claim can be sustained. As we will
see, it is largely based on findings related to jobs, anecdotal accounts, and shared-content
data.)
1. The First Claim: Fewer Owners Nationwide
The first claim, that rapid consolidation followed the Act, is uncontested.19 By
2002, even though the number of radio stations nationwide had increased by 5.4 percent,
the number of owners had declined by 33.6 percent (Prindle 2003, 14 n12). Whereas
media companies had been limited to owning no more than 40 stations before 1996, the
Act’s removal of any national cap led to radio behemoths (Bednarski 2003). The ink was
barely dry on the Act when radio deals began at a dizzying rate (Rathbun 1996), and
within five years the largest, Clear Channel, had gobbled up more than 1,200 stations
(DiCola 2006b, 13).20 As Boehlert (2001) explained, those stations had previously
belonged to 70 separate broadcast companies. As the former head of PBS and NBC saw
it:
What once was an industry dominated by locally owned and operated
stations and three national radio networks is now an industry dominated
by three giant corporations, each of which owns multiple stations in a
number of markets, and owns and programs hundreds of radio stations
throughout the nation. (Grossman, in Pew, 2004)
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The density of radio concentration led one researcher to observe, “The majority of local
radio markets have levels of concentration that ordinarily give rise to antitrust concerns
about excessive market power” (DiCola 2006b, 68). Arbitron, the radio rating service,
attributed the industry’s “unprecedented double-digit revenue gains,” from 1998 to 2000,
to consolidation: “With the loosening of national and local ownership caps in 1996,
groups have discovered how to leverage market clusters” (Radio’s Leading Indicator,
2005, 4).
2. The Second Claim: Jobs Wiped Out
The Act promised telecommunications reform that would lead to
“competition…private investment…and universal service.” Moreover, it heralded untold
new jobs (Boehlert 2001). Industries, including phone providers, TV and cable, predicted
the Act would add 1.5 million jobs and boost the economy by $2 trillion. (Who could
doubt reform was in order after 60 years? The Communications Act of 1934 was still in
effect.) By 2003, however, the market value of telecom companies had fallen by about $2
trillion, and they had shed about half-a-million jobs (Wexler 2005, 3).
The outcome was, as noted above, severe in the case of radio. So intense was
ownership contraction, one Clear Channel executive estimated the Act had erased 10,000
radio-related jobs (Boehlert 2001). Another, more rigorous, assessment found that “the
employment of news reporters declined by 56 percent, and employment of broadcast
technicians by 30 percent,” between 1996 and 2003, “in an average market” (DiCola
2006a, 23).
A now-famous story of near-disaster in North Dakota raises the prospect of
serious potential consequences where too few humans staff radio stations. So drastically
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had Clear Channel cut staff at its Minot cluster of six stations, no one answered the phone
when police called to announce an emergency: a freight train had derailed, releasing a
deadly cloud of anhydrous ammonia (Staples 2003). Equally concerning was word from
Harrisonburg, Virginia that four hours passed after the September 11, 2001, attack before
Clear Channel’s automated group of stations stopped playing music and began
broadcasting news (Dotinga 2002). Employees “couldn’t figure out how to do anything
because they had so few people in that building” (Prindle 2003, 347 n290).
3. The Third Claim: Diminished Local News/Public Affairs Nationwide
A decline in local news/public affairs impacts its important agenda-setting role in
facilitating political processes. By directing citizens’ attention to issues of public concern
local programming fulfills its “best established political role of journalism.” But,
“tabloidized” local news means serious journalism, “as we have known and valued it,”
may be relegated to “elite… small taste culture,” at the risk of removing it from the
genuinely mass media (Swanson 2000, 412).
One indication this has already happened, to a degree, following the Telecom Act
is the notable shift to public broadcasting. In a decade, from 1999 to 2009 (years during
which the Telecom Act transformed the radio landscape), the audience for National
Public Radio (NPR) doubled, reaching an audience of 26.4 million listeners weekly—far
more than USA Today’s 2.3 million daily circulation or FOX news’ 2.8 million prime
time audience (Kamenetz 2009). While it barely needs mention that the NPR audience is
largely “white, liberal, educated, elite,” by NPR’s own estimation, it serves only about 11
percent of Americans (AIR 2011). The sudden swell in NPR listenership following the
Act suggests a significant desire for political information was not being met by
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commercial broadcasters, and it offers support for Swanson’s thesis (2000) that
diminishment of local news/public affairs on commercial stations contributes to an antidemocratic class division of political information distribution.
Of the three claims, diminished local news/public affairs is the most difficult to
substantiate, not least because of its amorphous nature, conflicting interpretations of
localism (geographic versus content-based),21 and the dearth of studies into radio content.
An FCC study—published under pressure—into television programming found local
owners produced several more minutes of local news than distant owners because of
certain incentives: proximity to events, local advertiser satisfaction, and personal localowner interests.22 If radio owners respond to the same incentives, it stands to reason they
would produce more local news/public affairs.
One detailed project indicated post-Act damage to local radio news/public affairs
in Salt Lake City. Sanders (2007) found local owners far outpaced those of distant
centralized providers in their commitment to producing and programming local news.
Bonneville, the primary local owner, “employed more workers, with more experience in
the industry and in the local market,” and gave its news people “the most modern
[production] equipment and studio facilities.” Quantitative data found Bonneville and
another, smaller local Salt Lake owner producing more news minutes in every format
category, with large national owners offering the least (Sanders 2007, 178).
Many rely on jobs data to demonstrate that news/public affairs content was
significantly diminished by the Act. Two commentators found thoughtful, institutional
radio news reporting, a staple of 1960s-70s journalism (when all AM and some FM
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stations had news directors and reporting staff), had “all but disappeared” after the Act
(McChesney and Nichols 2010, 16).
Figure 1.

Source: McChesney and Nichols 2010, p.17.

The McChesney-Nichols chart (fig. 1) shows the decline in broadcast journalism jobs
over three decades was especially sharp between 1992-2002, reflecting the Act’s impact.
Boehlert (2001) also saw jobs lost to the Act as inherently indicative of diminished local
news/public affairs: the “near abandonment of local news” (Boehlert 2001).
Bearing out that assertion, the Radio-Television News Directors Association
(RTNDA) found (2004) that, increasingly, formats other than all-news were receiving
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program content from “a central news department.” A single station was, on average,
providing news for three stations (in Pew, 2004). Consolidation proponents point out the
new arrangements could have allowed stations previously offering no news to start
providing it (in Pew 2004). But, others saw a slide toward "a horror show of packaged
homogeneity and cynical, demographic button pushing” (Powers 2004). At the very least,
the lost jobs meant fewer local residents were making decisions about what stories to
report (DiCola 2006a, 25).
Shared content may also indicate less local news/public affairs, as when
announcers “voice-track” content for multiple stations (Silberman 1999). For example, a
Clear Channel staffer in San Diego infuses some regional detail into recorded content to
make it “seem local” in Boise, Medford, and Santa Barbara. Because a company can
utilize the same employee or group of employees to produce content for several markets,
fewer content judgments are made locally. On the other hand, Clear Channel contends the
technique brings otherwise unaffordable talent into many markets, “a huge benefit to the
audience” (Matthews 2002).
All three of these post-Telecom Act claims may have serious implications for
democracy. If ownership consolidation (by distancing owners from local concerns)
eroded the links between stations and their communities of license, if staff cuts (by
eliminating local news judgments) diminished radio’s political role, and if shared content
(by centralizing programming) limited the number of perspectives, then the Act
apparently diminished democratic opportunities. I wanted to gauge the Act’s impact in
Portland.
D. Methods
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Informed by scholarly studies and knowledge of the local radio industry, my
mixed-design study examined four elements:
1) Station ownership patterns
2) Jobs
3) Public files data
4) Survey of broadcast professionals
I selected six stations that have become local institutions over many years (compare
Appendices D and E). Retaining popular appeal and (relatively) consistent formats
between 1996 and 2011, my sample stations fall into three station pairs, by owner:
Table 1
OWNER 2011

STATIONS

Clear Channel

KKRZ, KKCW

Entercom

KWJJ, KGON

Alpha

KUPL, KINK

Except in the case of Alpha, the owners had long company histories, enabling the
assessment of patterns over time (e.g. employees per station, news/public affairs
programming).
For the first element, station ownership patterns, I looked into Arbitron and other
archives23 to document the number of stations and owners between 1996 and 2011.
Second, to ascertain any decline in jobs, I accessed corporate 10-K and S-1 annual reports
from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—comparing stations owned and
staff employed during or near 1996 to the same criteria in 2009.24 I should note that this
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finding indicates only overall staff reductions, not specifically news/public affairs jobs.25
The third element, public files data, reflected the changed nature of news/public affairs
programming.26
Finally, I conducted a confidential survey of Portland broadcast professionals
associated with a variety of music, news, or news/talk stations. No restrictions (age,
gender, ethnicity, experience, etc.) were applied—only the stipulation that respondents
worked (or had worked in recent years) in radio journalism. Of surveys emailed to 22
stations or broadcasters I received 17 relevant responses.27 Although this is a small
sample, respondents serve a broad range of stations and formats, indicated in table 2.
Also noteworthy, respondents described their years of experience as ranging from four to
25 years, offering the prospect of both fresh and institutional perspectives.28

Table 2.

Stations Represented in Radio Survey 2011

22 invitations were issued to broadcast journalists associated with Portland music,
news, or news/talk stations, representing a wide range of formats. 17 completed
surveys were tabulated, representing the views of those presently or recently employed
at 11 different stations:
KEX 1190 AM
KGON 92.3 FM
KXL 750 AM
KPAM 860 AM
KINK 101.9 FM
KKCW 103 FM
KXJM 107.5 FM
KLTH 106.7 FM
KUPL 98.7 FM
KKSN*
KOTK*

(News)
(Classic Rock)
(News Talk)
(News Talk)
(Album Adult Alternative)
(Adult Contemporary)
(Rhythmic Contemporary)
(Classic Hits)
(Country)

CHR: Contemporary Hit Radio
AC: Adult Contemporary
AOR: Album Oriented Rock
AAA: Adult Album Alternative
*Station has changed formats and call letters since respondent worked there.
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After inquiring in the first questions whether respondents worked in Portland
radio news “between 1986 and today,” (allowing at least a decade before and after the
Telecom Act), and for how many years, I moved on to the substance of the survey: openended questions inviting opinions as to the most “important roles radio should play in a
community,” whether local commercial radio provided “an adequate source of local
news/public affairs,” and if not, why respondent thought “stations [had] reduced such
programming.” Respondents could choose from several possible reasons: ownership
efforts to reduce cost; buy-outs by larger media companies; audiences prefer non-news
(entertainment); people can get local news elsewhere (TV, Internet, etc.); or, the
participant could volunteer some other possible reason.
Then, the following statements were proposed, asking participants to describe, on
a scale of one to 10, whether they agreed or disagreed, and how strongly.
Table 3.
8. Radio is just like any other business, and should be able to profit
in the same way as any other business.
9. Because it uses public airwaves, radio is different from other
businesses.
10. I think we have plenty of choices for local news/public affairs on
the radio.
11. Except for public broadcasting, local radio reporting on
important public issues is pretty limited
12. Radio programming should not be regulated. The public interest
should be determined only by ratings (how popular a program or
station is).
13. Radio stations should be required to air some programs that
reflect local concerns.
14. As a broadcast journalist, I feel my ability to communicate
important news subjects to my listening audience is limited in the
current media environment.
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I also inquired about content sharing among stations, and closed with another essay-style
opportunity for participants to offer their thoughts about the “public service
responsibilities of local radio.” Complete survey text responses are found in Appendix F,
highlighted in red.
The Radio Survey 2011 invitation and questionnaire were approved by the PSU
Human Subjects Research Review Committee, after it determined there were no ethical
concerns. Based on the survey, and the other research elements listed above, I offer this
Portland assessment as a supplement to the ongoing inquiry into the impact of media
policy on ownership concentration, jobs, and radio news/public affairs. First, a historical
perspective on radio’s role as a mediator of the public sphere.
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Part III. Historical Perspective: The Public Sphere and Radio
A strictly economic language functions to distort, perhaps even obliterate, specifically public
concerns that remain silent while corporate priorities hold sway.
Carl Boggs, 2000

A. The Public Sphere
From the Athenian Pnyx to the Roman Forum, civil decision making has taken
place in some public realm. And, while the logistical limitation of conducting democracy
face-to-face was somewhat overcome with the advent of representative government, “to
surmount it completely required the press.” Always a necessary component of the
“physical conditions for the formation and propagation of public opinion,” the newspaper
has, through time, comprised that forum for public decision-making (J. S. Mill [1859]
1998 , 210).
Similarly, in America, as Tocqueville famously described, town meetings were
arenas of local civil association, fundamental spheres of democracy: places where people
came together to exchange information and discuss/promote their ideas. But, what made
“political life circulate to every corner of this vast land,” was the press (Tocqueville
[1835] 2003, 217). This public space, where prevailing opinion developed to influence
governing policy, theoretically gave the large and expanding country the capacity to live
up to its name: (demos, people + kratia, rule) government by the people.29 And, because
technological advances made it possible, mass communications have become the modern
public sphere (Habermas 1962). Each new form of communication, first newspapers, then
broadcast, and now the Internet, mediates the realm where citizens turn their attention (or
tune in) to information and ideas. According to democratic theory, public opinion bubbles
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out of this sphere of public discussion and, through representatives in government,
informs public policy.
1. The Press as Mediator of the Public Sphere
Since media entities facilitate the public discourse crucial to self-governance they
are assigned special significance beyond that of mere market participants. If a television,
for example, were just a toaster with pictures, as FCC Chairman Mark Fowler suggested
(Nossiter 1985), economic logic would treat it like other consumer products. But, because
electronic communications devices, unlike toasters, have tremendous potential to shape
thought and opinion, their utility to society is not limited to an economic context. Rather,
the news media (by definition) mediate30 between citizens and government, circulating
(sometimes vital) information. Without this communication neither citizens nor officials
would be able to carry out their constitutionally presumed roles in the policymaking
process. But, because the Constitution ascribes no institutional role for the press, its
function as a component of the American democratic system has been (and remains) the
subject of much debate.
Although media are sometimes conceived as an institution, even a fourth branch
of government,31 political scientists have struggled to characterize the political role of the
press because “the news media are less formally constituted and less bounded” than the
institutions political scientists customarily examine. Drawing from behavioralist,
sociological, and political science threads, Cook (2005a) finds institutions and media
have much in common: they both emphasize accepted rules and routines that have
developed over time and across organizations, and preside over a central part of social
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and political life (Cook 2005a, 13, 66 – 71). Hence news organizations, however diverse,
comprise an American institution, albeit a controversial one.
Research32 indicates that media are a de facto extension of government—
something Walter Lippmann observed, with disapproval, in 1922 (in Graber 2007), and a
phenomenon that grew in the 1960s with diminishing political party influence (Patterson
1994). Despite the amorphous nature of news and its purveyors, construing the press as a
political institution implies a debt to the public interest. Noting in a 1974 speech, for
example, that the press was the lone private business singled out for specific
constitutional protection, Justice Stewart concluded the First Amendment was designed
“to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three
official branches” (in Cook 2005a, 178). But, pinning down specific obligations that
accompany such responsibility has been complicated, in part because of diverse Court
rulings.
2. The First Amendment: Multiple Views of Press Freedom
a. The Watchdog
In its attempt to assess the constitutionality of various news media practices the
U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed multiple conceptions of press freedom,33 especially the
watchdog and marketplace of ideas models. As Justice Black explained, quoting
Madison, the First Amendment was intended to curtail the power granted to the
controversial central government in the original Constitution. "The people shall not be
deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and
the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty shall be inviolable”
(Madison 1789)34 It was the “paramount” responsibility of a free press to “prevent any
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part of the government from deceiving the people,” Black declared, aligning himself with
the watchdog conception of the press.35 Douglas concurred, pointing out that the press
clause of the First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law…abridging the
freedom…of the press”)36 leaves “no room for government restraint.” The Amendment’s
“dominant purpose,” Douglas found, was to prevent the government from suppressing or
punishing the “dissemination of material that is embarrassing to the powers-that-be.”37
And Justice Stewart (joined by White), concurring, also saw the Amendment as a shelter
for government critics:
[T]he only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas
of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened
citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here
protect the values of democratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps
here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic
purpose of the First Amendment. For without an informed and free press
there cannot be an enlightened people.38
With that, Stewart established himself as a key spokesman of the watchdog theory.39
But even concurring justices in that famous case (in which the Nixon
administration sought to stop the publication of leaked Pentagon documents) had nuanced
readings of the First Amendment. Justice Brennan, for example, agreed there could be no
injunction against publication—except when, in wartime, the release of strategic
information might imperil troops. And, since the Pentagon documents in question were
historical (void of ongoing operations detail), Brennan announced (recalling Schenck
1919, and Near 1931) the “chief purpose” of the First Amendment was to prevent prior
restraints on publication.40 But, though some consider “the Pentagon Papers case” to be
the strongest Court statement to date on press freedom (Epstein and Walker 2010, 302),
three justices dissented.
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Justice Burger, rejecting an “absolute” view of the First Amendment, found “the
imperative of a free and unfettered press comes into collision,” at times, with “another
imperative, the effective functioning of a complex modern government…and powers of
the Executive.” Echoing that concern with constitutionally granted executive authority in
the “field of foreign affairs,” and commenting on the historic speed with which the Court
issued a short “per curiam” opinion (four days), Justice Harlan dissented, calling the
Court “almost irresponsibly feverish.” Justice Blackmun, also dissenting, agreed,
pointing out a replacement for the Near test had yet to be “properly developed.”41
Although the Court is often even more divided than in this 6-3 decision, New York Times
v. U.S. exemplifies the degree to which judicial authorities differ on the meaning of press
freedom.
b. The Marketplace of Ideas
Well before the Pentagon Papers case, and long since, theories have proliferated
as to the scope and purpose of the First Amendment. As is well-known, the marketplace
of ideas (associated with Justices Holmes, Black, Brennan, and Judge Learned Hand),
holds that a plethora of ideas naturally filter toward the best. Though Holmes introduced
the marketplace theory to America, the belief that superior thinking would emerge from
uninhibited, robust debate dates back (at least) to Milton and J. S. Mill (Ingber 1984, 3).
As Brennan summed up (1964), drawing from famous cases, the First Amendment
attempts to secure "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources;”42 it is "fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people;"43 it "presupposes
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues."44 The
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nation’s profound commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate “may well
include…sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” (in
Cook 2005b, 4). Even erroneous statements made, inevitably, in the unfettered exchange
of ideas, must be protected to provide the “breathing space” needed by the marketplace of
ideas.45
Since no objective truth exists, however, critics point out that “truth” is subjective
and created. Perceptions of truth would thus vary according to social circumstances and
power relations among groups. Hence, as Baker argues in his ”market failure” model, the
marketplace of ideas is inherently biased in favor of presently dominant groups (Baker
1977).
c. Hybrid Conceptions: Public Deliberation, Self-realization
Along with the watchdog and marketplace three other related interpretations of
the First Amendment should be mentioned: A hybrid of the marketplace and watchdog
(linked to Thomas Emerson) predicts robust debate in pursuit of truth will improve
government and thus society (Ingber 1984, 4). And, the closely related self-realization
theory (launched by Justice Brandeis (following Madison), and developed by Baker,
Emerson, Redish) holds that the ultimate purpose of government is to further individual
self-development, facilitated by free expression (Stern 1990, 927). Sunstein has crosspollinated elements of Madison, Brandeis, and Alexander Meiklejohn and distilled from
them a public deliberation model, which prizes both political equality and a shared civic
culture, and seeks to promote “reflective and deliberative debate about possible courses
of action (Sunstein 1997, 169).
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Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government
the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They…believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensible to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination
of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people;
that public discussion is a political duty… (Brandeis 1927)46
If Brandeis, Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, Holmes, and Hand, along with
Milton, Mill, Madison, Emerson, Meiklejohn, Redish, Baker, and Sunstein are all correct,
citizens who may speak freely have abundant opportunities to develop their faculties,
flesh out the truth, and live under laws and leaders of their own choosing. Difficulty
arises, however, in sorting though when and if such pursuits may be abridged, and which
are crucial to self-governance—and thus may not be (Meiklejohn [1948] 1960).
3. Public v. Private Speech
The broad range of free speech theories is a fertile backdrop for a broadcast media
marketplace, where purveyors of information products have held up the First Amendment
against government attempts to control their programming. This defense adopts the
popular idea that regulation of speech is inherently an infringement of speech, an
unauthorized government intrusion into a person’s (or broadcaster’s) right to speech
protection under the First Amendment. This is, according to the Court, a fallacy.
Unlike print media (produced using privately owned equipment), TV and radio
stations (operated using publicly owned airwaves, not available to all) are subject to
public oversight:
[T]he people…retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends
and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and
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listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount… It is the
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right
may not be constitutionally abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.47
Although some analysts have interpreted speech protection as foreclosing substantive
media regulation (Fowler and Brenner 1981), others contend Amendment doctrine
“permits non-suppressive, content-based regulation” (Mangarian 2008, 849, n22).
Because the argument herein alleges a failure of the market model to provide adequate
local news/public affairs programming, it is useful to clarify what is public and what is
private, an important distinction for programming media “in the public interest,”48 and a
concern that long predates broadcasting.
Chief Justice Waite, for example, affirmed state power to regulate even private
property on behalf of the public good, when he upheld grain elevator rates.
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at
large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the
public has an interest, he in effect, grants the public an interest in that use
and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good…
(Waite 1877, in Rainey 1993, 283)49
Even conservative Justice Field, although dissenting, saw public interest regulation as
constitutional in certain narrowly defined circumstances—such as when “some right or
privilege is conferred by the government or municipality,” or where the government’s
action renders “the use of his property…more valuable to him, or [where] he thereby
enjoys an advantage over others” (Field 1877, in Rainey 1993, 283).
Licensing broadcasters to use the public airwaves is, since not available to all, a
privilege granted to a trustee. Frequently, too, are broadcasters’ private properties (e.g.
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capital value of their stations, copyrighted products) made more valuable to him/her by
virtue of that government license. And, since broadcasting a message to a mass audience
is inherently more influential than shouting from a street corner, the broadcaster has a
clear advantage over others wishing to convey an idea. Although developed within the
legal realm concerned with economic property rights (rather than liberties of expression)
the logic from both sides in Munn serve as useful “historical analogues” for the
imposition of public obligations in electronic media (Rainey 1993, 282-84). If anything,
economic liberties jurisprudence may gain greater relevance as the market model is
increasingly emphasized in broadcast deregulation. And, it is the crux of the
public/private speech distinction to which I now turn.
Out of the doctrinal ferment over free expression, Meiklejohn (1948) distilled two
kinds of speech, public and private—only one of which is constitutionally sacrosanct.
[The First Amendment] has no concern about the 'needs of many men to
express their opinions.' It provides, not for many men, but for all men. ...It
cares for the public need. And since that wider interest includes all the
narrower ones...it is prior to them all. The public discussion of it,
therefore, has a constitutional status which no pursuit of an individual
purpose can ever claim. It stands alone, as the cornerstone of the structure
of self-government. (Meiklejohn 1948, 55)
The nature and context of rights groupings in the Constitution show that while
public speech must be unfettered, private-purpose speech may be constitutionally
restrained. For example, public rights are addressed in the First Amendment, while
private liberties are covered in the Fifth. Evidently, the "liberty" of speech (which is
subject to abridgement, with due process) is "correlated, in the Fifth Amendment, with
our [private] rights to 'life' and 'property'...individual possessions." As with many forms
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of individual action and possessions, private interests are "protected by the
Constitution—not from regulation, but from undue regulation..." (Meiklejohn [1948]
1960, 36).
The constitutional status of a merchant advertising his wares, of a paid
lobbyist fighting for the advantage of his client, is utterly different from
that of a citizen who is planning for the general welfare. And from this it
follows that the Constitution provides differently for two different kinds of
'freedom of speech.' (Meiklejohn [1948] 1960, 37)
What then of the needs of many men to express their opinions? If Meiklejohn is correct,
the arguments of profit-oriented media (that they should be free of government mandates)
would apparently have more validity framed within the due process context of the Fifth
(and Fourteenth) Amendments than behind the free expression shield of the First. As
Barron (1967) saw—along with Meiklejohn, and Justices Black (1945) and White
(1969)—rather than “a lock that safeguards the market-derived expressive prerogatives of
powerful media corporations,” First Amendment speech protection was “a key, designed
to open public debate to the diverse range of participants and ideas necessary for our
democratic system to flourish (Mangarian 2008, 847).
B. Radio
Among modern mass communications, radio stands out as a significant—but
perhaps under-appreciated—contributor to the public sphere because of its easy
accessibility, low cost, and pervasive penetration. People spend more time listening to
news on the radio each day than they do reading newspapers or getting news online
(Olmstead 2011, Audio Essay). Although a majority of Americans cite television as their
primary news source, more than ninety percent say they listen to radio in homes, cars, or
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offices. The sharp increase in public radio audiences since the 1996 Telecom Act
indicates a demand for informational content (Powers 2003).
Moreover, while new media (e.g. satellite radio, digital devices, the Internet) have
otherwise devoured a slice of the traditional media pie, radio has been somewhat
impervious to its digital competition.50 Thus, regardless of whether listeners are seeking
content, they are receiving information that has the potential to weigh on individuals’
decisions about public life. The ubiquity of radio gives rise to questions about what
messages listeners are receiving, from what sources, and to what effect. These issues
have driven both the exploitation of radio as communications medium, and government
policy regulating its use.
1. Radio: Historical Perspective
The story of radio began with tinkerers, sailors, educators, and entrepreneurs,
until a Marconi operator stunned the world with news of the Titanic disaster, drawing the
interest of giant corporations. 51 General Electric (GE) joined American Marconi to form
the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), soon adding American Telephone and
Telegraph (AT&T), which held a needed patent. Once its sole remaining large-scale
competitor set off a national mania for radio sets (by broadcasting the Harding elections
returns in 1920), RCA took in Westinghouse—creating by 1921 a powerhouse that
owned all the patents (two thousand of them) needed to dominate the future of
broadcasting (Barnouw 1966, Rosen 1980).
“We will maintain them [radio activities] free—free of monopoly, free in program,
and free in speech…” declared Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, who claimed
(1925) government oversight would ensure attention to the public interest.52 But, in fact,
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Hoover, urged by industry leaders at the first Radio Conference (1922), had already
assigned a limited number of the most desirable wavelengths to “an aristocracy of wellfinanced stations,” giving them strength to influence policy (Barnouw 1966, 94, 100).
Although Congress had directed the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1923 to
investigate whether RCA constituted a monopoly, there was no public hint of anti-trust
concern as RCA debuted the first National Broadcasting Company (NBC), attended by
captains of industry and finance (1926). The New York gala was followed by a rapid
sequence of significant events: passage of the 1927 Radio Act, the dropped FTC
investigation (1928), and Hoover’s election (1928). His presidential acceptance speech
(1929) was carried by 107 NBC and CBS stations (Barnouw 1966, 173, 201, 233).
In 1928, 732 stations, many independent of the networks, held licenses. Often
publicity vehicles for newspapers and businesses, the independents were a diverse
group—including WCFL, a Chicago labor station, and WEVD, in New York, named for
socialist Eugene Victor Debs. Scattered religious stations were on the air, along with
educational studios that offered “concerts, talks, including full college courses.” To clear
up interference, however, the Federal Regulatory Commission (FRC) announced the
ranks had to be thinned by at least 100 stations. Since the FRC relied on technical
superiority to determine survivors, educational stations and other non-profits operated
from classrooms or basements were vulnerable. While a full accounting of all the
independents is outside the realm of this paper, of 151 educational stations licensed by
then, 24 remained in 1933. (Barnouw 1966, 173, 209). Thus began radio broadcasting “in
the public interest.”
2. Radio Regulation: Underlying Principles
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Although elusive, officials have relied largely on two Court decisions to
determine what the public interest entails. In NBC v. U.S. (1943),53 the Court determined
the policy goals of competition and localism fell within the scope of the public interest.
Combined with language from AP v. U.S. (1945)54 two years later, insisting that the
“dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,” serves the public
interest, Congress and the FCC have interpreted the public interest as requiring
promotion of “competition, diversity, and localism” (Prindle 2003, 280). But, as Napoli
(2003) explained, those vehicles derive from the foundational marketplace of ideas.
a. The Marketplace of Ideas
First invoked in American jurisprudence by Holmes (1919),55 as noted above, the
idea marketplace serves media policy as a dual-purpose metaphor: for democracy, in
which free-thinking citizens ideally inform and govern themselves; and economy,
wherein productively managed resources maximize economic efficiency and consumer
satisfaction (Napoli 2003, 24, 97). Stemming from the marketplace are other key media
policy goals closely linked with democratic theory: diversity, competition, universal
service, and, localism.
b. Diversity, Competition, Universal Service
Diversity goes beyond the mere number of marketplace participants (which
counts competitors) to the characteristics of participants (e.g. minority station owners)
and to programming (e.g. variety of viewpoints presented). Competition takes a purely
economic approach assessing such factors as market power, barriers to entry, and prices.
Universal service—unlike competition, but harmonious with democratic theory—holds
that citizens are equally entitled to resources, just as citizen access to news/public affairs
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is crucial to the participation required of democracy (Dahl 1989; Delli Carpini 2000;
Dewey [1927] 1954; Meiklejohn [1948] 1960; Schattschneider [1960] 2008). The Court
recently upheld aspects of universal service and democratic goals in Turner Broadcasting
Sys. V. FCC (1994).56
c. Localism
That local programming was at the core of broadcast policy was confirmed early
in legal disputes over regulation. The Court (1943) called local programming “a vital part
of community life,”57 and judged service distribution (1955) as equitable if it provided “a
community radio mouthpiece.”58 Presenting “programs of local interest and importance”
were “the prime factor” in broadcast regulation, according to the D.C Circuit (1956).59
As with the public interest, though, exactly what constitutes localism remains
controversial.
The FCC (2004) defined localism as “programming that is responsive to the
interests and needs of [broadcasters’] communities of license,”60 but declined to specify
the precise meaning of either “programming” or “responsive.” Thus some argue that
localism is vague, and not historically mandated (Cole and Murck 2007). The U.S. House
tried to pin down the meaning (2007), declaring it “local operations, local research, local
management, locally originated programming, local artists, and local news and events.”61
The idea of localism is consistent with our federal political system, which
“divides power between a central government and [other] subdivisional governments,
giving each substantial functions” (Corwin and Peltason 1997, 17). From schools, parks,
and libraries, to soil, sewer, and water districts, to cities, counties, and states, local
decisions are made about community resources in which local residents have an interest.
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Hence, broadcast news/public affairs programs emanating from a particular geographic
“point-of-origin” were historically presumed to increase station interaction with residents,
and result in responsive programming (Napoli 2001, 376). The FCC required, for
example, that radio and TV stations locate a studio in the area they were licensed to serve,
and originate half of their non-network programming from that studio (Napoli 2001, 378).
An alternative view of localism, one gaining interest in the Internet era, gave
more weight to content than geography. Stations were required, for example, to ascertain
the top local concerns through surveys, and to produce relevant programs.62 Keeping
these foundational principles in mind, I summarize regulatory actions during the trustee
period of broadcasting.
3. The Trustee Model
a. Radio Act of 1927
The Radio Act of 1927 authorized the FRC to grant licenses for the use of radio
channels by “individuals, firms, or corporations, for limited periods of time,” when the
Commission determined it served the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.”63
Thus, broadcasters were trustees of the public airwaves, upon their pledge to the public
interest. But, that mandate was undefined when, in a set of guidelines known as Great
Lakes, the FRC infused it with meaning for the first time.
Programming content, the agency announced (1929), should reflect the “tastes,
needs, and desires of all substantial groups” within its listening community. The agency
also called upon stations to provide “free and fair competition of opposing views”
(Rainey 1993, 280). Because it contained the “seeds of concepts that would later
germinate” into major policy principles (e.g. localism, ascertainment, the Fairness
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Doctrine), Great Lakes could be considered the FRC’s most important policy statement
(Smith, Meeske, and Wright, 240).
b. Communications Act of 1934
To put down a rising tide of criticism over the entrenchment of commercial
broadcasters (McChesney 1993), the 1934 Communications Act entailed a compromise:
It promised that broadcasters would allow non-profits “access” to their facilities, and that
the new Federal Communications Commission (FCC) would study the idea of frequency
set-asides for non-commercial uses (Brown 1989, 283). Essentially reprising the 1927
Act, the 1934 statute made just one other significant change. The FRC, a temporary body,
was replaced with the permanent FCC, meaning radio issues would undergo less-frequent
scrutiny by Congress.
c. 1940s: Chain Broadcasting Rules, Blue Book, Fairness Doctrine
Increasingly disturbed by the rise of network broadcasting at the expense of
eclectic local stations, the FCC determined that NBC should relinquish one of its (Red
and Blue) networks. Its Chain Broadcasting Rules (1941) also limited, for the first time,
network control over affiliates (e.g. length of contracts, must-carry rules) (Napoli 2003,
210). Deflecting a vigorous challenge from NBC, the Court upheld FCC authority to
regulate, affirmed the public interest as the “touchstone” value of regulation, offered a
scarcity rationale, and declared that licensing requirements did not violate broadcasters’
First Amendment freedoms.64
Permitted by that sweeping affirmation, the FCC issued (1946) an outline of how
stations could demonstrate that their licenses should be renewed. In a staff report
nicknamed the “Blue Book,” the agency suggested stations carry more: sustaining
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(unsponsored) programs, local live programs, local public issues discussions, and less
advertising. Since never adopted nor repudiated, these guidelines—emphasizing the
importance of local productions—remained suggestions (Krasnow and Goodman 1998,
611).65
That radio stations were expected to take an even-handed approach was more
assumed than promulgated in policy until The Mayflower Doctrine (1941) held that:
Radio can serve as an instrument of democracy only when devoted
to…the exchange of ideas fairly and objectively presented. A truly free
radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the licensee. It cannot be
used to support the candidacies of his friends…In short, the broadcaster
cannot be an advocate.66
Dissatisfaction with this apparent ban on editorializing led to the Fairness
Doctrine (1949). Instead of prohibiting editorials, the new doctrine called for a
“fair and balanced presentation of differing viewpoints” on controversial issues.67
Contending the mission “of mass communication in a democracy [was] the
development of an informed public opinion through the public dissemination of
news and ideas concerning the vital public issues of the day,” the Fairness
Doctrine was central to broadcasting regulation under the trustee model and was
upheld in Red Lion v. FCC (1969)68 (Rainey 1993, 302 n1).
d. 1950-70s: Ascertainment
After hearings on the quiz show scandals of the late 1950s, the FCC determined
that broadcasters’ responsibilities should be clarified. To that end, it issued the 1960
Programming Policy Statement listing fourteen “major elements usually necessary to
meet the public interest,”69 (see Appendix A). Of the highest priority were programs
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offering opportunities for “local self-expression” and “development and use of local
talent.”
But a new and controversial element in the 1960 Statement directed licensees to
discover the “tastes, needs, and desires” of their listeners (reiterating the language from
Great Lakes) through surveys of community leaders and the general public. Although
some broadcasters objected to this ascertainment of local concerns through surveys, the
D.C. Circuit upheld it. The court found Suburban Broadcasters, whose owners did not
reside in Elizabeth, New Jersey, had made “no inquiry into the characteristics or
programming needs of that community,” and whose application, in fact, was “identical”
to those Suburban had submitted in Berwyn, IL, and Alameda, CA. As Judge Bazelon put
it, “Communities may differ, and so may their needs.”70 Several years later, the FCC
added that, along with ascertaining local concerns, the licensee was expected to offer
programs addressing those concerns.71 Thus into the 1970s ascertaining and formulating
programs responsive to local needs was elemental to the public interest, but this would
soon change.
4. The Market Model
Famously describing television as a “toaster with pictures” (Nossiter 1985),
Reagan-appointee Mark Fowler led the drive to do away with the trustee model. Claiming
regulatory processes infringed on broadcasters’ First Amendment rights, Fowler
announced “long overdue” the abandonment of the scarcity rationale on which the trustee
model of licensing had long been premised.
Whether you call it "paternalism" or "nannyism -- it is "Big Brother," and
it must cease…Under the coming marketplace approach, the Commission
should as far as possible, defer to a broadcaster's judgment about how best
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to compete for viewers and listeners, because this serves the public
interest. (Fowler 1982, 213)
Invoking Adam Smith, Fowler declared, “consumers are best off when…resources are
allocated” such that people may “satisfy their wants as fully as possible” (Fowler and
Brenner 1981, 210). Under Fowler’s leadership, the FCC agreed competitive market
forces, rather than regulatory mandates, would more effectively serve the policy goal of
generating locally relevant programming. To that end, the FCC implemented new
policies.
a. Most Rules Eliminated
In a fell swoop, the Fowler FCC abandoned (1981) many radio policies that had
been promulgated over decades. Overturned were procedures for ascertaining community
concerns, limits on advertising, program logs, and requirements for non-commercial
programming.72 Saying Congress had authorized it (1934) to act in the public interest,
“We conceive of that interest to require us to regulate where necessary, to deregulate
where warranted, and above all, to assure maximum service to the public at the lowest
cost and with the least amount of regulation and paperwork” (in Krasnow and Goodman
1998, 617).
Ascertainment, as Fowler saw it, often amounted to no more than “five-minute
interviews with community leaders” that usually produced a “perfunctory list of
community needs and of standard programs to fulfill those needs” (Fowler and Brenner
1981, 208-9). Though community needs were still to be assessed, how they were
addressed would henceforth be up to broadcasters. Further, in light of technical advances
in production and transmission, the Commission concluded there was no “causal
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relationship between the main-studio rules and service to the community of license.”
Thus, both the (content-based) ascertainment of local concerns through surveys, and the
(geography-based) 50% program-origination requirement were eliminated. And, doing
away with the main studio rule, the FCC would now allow broadcasters to operate from
anywhere within their “principal community contour,” a broader geographic region
(Napoli 2001, 378; Rainey 1993, 272).
The FCC also eliminated (1983) several policies admonishing broadcasters to
avoid certain dubious programming and commercial practices. These included station
personnel conflicts of interest, misleading concert promotions, and the broadcast of false,
misleading, and deceptive commercials.73 Upholding the Commission’s elimination of
“underbrush policies,” D.C Circuit Appeals Court found the public interest standard was
best left to the Commission, if it reasonably found that a “market approach offer[ed] the
best means of controlling the abuse,” said the D.C Circuit Appeals Court 74
b. Postcard Renewal Implemented
Whereas license renewal applications had previously required quantitative data on
sample weeks of programming, a new streamlined process would ask only five questions:
1) broadcasters’ name and location; 2) whether they had filed annual employment
reports; 3) if the station complied with regulations against alien ownership; 4) whether
licensee was the subject of any adverse character or conduct findings; 5) and, if public
file documents were up to date.75 This process was to be so comparatively simple, the
answers could fit on a postcard (Hagelin and Wimmer 1986, 217).
c. Fairness Doctrine Abolished
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Among the most controversial deregulatory actions under the marketplace
approach was the demise of the Fairness Doctrine, which had been implemented to
ensure a diversity of ideas. Ironically, the same rationale that led to its creation ultimately
led to its demise. After the D.C. Circuit accepted broadcasters’ claims that the burden of
the doctrine had actually discouraged them from taking up troublesome issues, and
interfered with their speech protection under the First Amendment, The FCC did away
with the policy in 1987, citing a “chilling effect.”76
d. Ownership Limits Relaxed
Early in the market model’s tenure, the FCC began to ease limits on the number
of stations broadcasters could own. Heretofore one owner could control no more than
seven TV channels, seven AM, and seven FM radio stations (the so-called 7-7-7 rule),
but ceilings were raised to twelve (the 12-12-12 rule) in 1984.77 The national ownership
cap was again expanded in 1992 to 18 AM and 18 FM stations. Then, as is well known,
all restrictions were lifted (1996) on the number of radio stations a single media company
could own nationwide. The 1996 Telecommunications Act also raised the lid on the
number of local stations a firm could own within a single market—a limit pegged to
market size.
5. Critical Evaluation of Both Models
While there is much to admire (the trustee model’s community ties, the market
model’s simplicity) both models are flawed. Both models, for example, illustrate the
incentive for public officials to defer to broadcasters’ interests. Hoover’s grant of prime
radio frequencies to broadcast behemoths, at the expense of small non-profits, exposed
the trustee model’s fragile relationship with the public interest. Perhaps as significant was
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Congress’ award to (TV) broadcasters: tens of billions of dollars worth of radio spectrum
free, at the behest of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the market
model’s most overt example of media power over officials (Snider 2005).78 Senator Bob
Dole accused the NAB of “bullying Congress” (Stern 1996). As Senator John McCain
put it, the threat of withholding media access or of unfavorable coverage “is an unstated,
unspoken message always in the room” (in Snider 2005, 220). So deferential were
regulators under the market model, they sometimes concealed their own studies, if those
studies suggested policies unfavorable to broadcasters.79
Another worry with both models is broadcasters’ inducement to secrecy about
their influence in policy matters, evident in the lead up to both the Communications Act
(1934) and the Telecommunications Act (1996). Despite significant public objection to
the original commercialization of radio, there is no evidence any broadcaster opened a
forum for public discussion of its merits (McChesney 1993). In fact, broadcasters
apparently buried complaints they received (Barnouw 1966, 206). And, although print
widely reported the spectrum allocation part of the 1996 Telecom deal as a “giveaway,”
“the Godzilla of corporate welfare,” and “TV’s big stick,” commercial television avoided
mentioning it, in what was criticized by print media as a TV news blackout (Snider 2005,
442).80 Moreover, in the debate leading up to its passage, there was almost no discussion
of the Act’s possible impact on radio. A source familiar with NAB lobby tactics said the
group knew to “lay low.” Had there had been a separate radio deregulation bill, the NAB
insider said, “it wouldn’t have passed” (Boehlert 2001).
And, both models rely on advertising which shapes programming in antidemocratic ways—as has been empirically demonstrated since the 1940s. Lazarsfeld and
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Merton put it simply (1948): “he who pays the piper generally calls the tune.” They found
commercially sponsored mass media avoided minority or critical perspectives (to keep
consumers in a buying mood) and thus restrained the cogent development of a genuinely
critical outlook. Further, researchers saw audiences narcotized, receiving information but
not acting upon it (in Marris and Thornham, 2000, 23).
Because the commodity for sale is not radio programs but the audience’s attention
(Smythe 1982), and since advertisers seek audiences likely to buy their products, listeners
are targeted for their demographic profile (e.g. age, income, profession, educational level,
etc.). Waldfogel’s “economic theory of discrimination” explains why markets will
underserve “preference minorities,” small groups with atypical or critical preferences:
“The market delivers fewer products—and less associated satisfaction—to these groups
simply because they are small.” In other words, profit-maximizers “serve the core
audience and neglect minorities”—whether of a demographic or viewpoint (critical)
nature. This largest-market-share ethic undercuts broadcast journalists’ ability to deliver
culturally diverse programming, leading to generalized, homogenized content.81
Market pressures unleashed upon radio by the Telecom Act, with their drive
toward radical ownership concentration, meant fewer people producing more product.
The economic logic of consolidation is to reduce labor costs by
centralizing content production, reducing reporting expenditures,
repurposing content across media platforms, and filling the news hole with
low-budget content such as coverage of weather, crime, and accidents.
Meanwhile, coverage of local politics and elections has reached crisis
levels of inadequacy. (Kimmelman, Scott, and Cooper 2006, 17)
By misapplying an economic frame to a public good, the market model stands out as a
singularly devastating threat to public discourse. Because news/public affairs products
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are public goods (one person’s use or benefit from the item does not affect its use or
benefit to others), market incentives are not sufficient to support the discursive structures
democracy demands.
“First copy” or upfront costs (creating a media product for the first time) are
substantial, and remain the same no matter how many people tune in. Thus market
emphasis does not encourage broadcasters to produce thoughtful or investigative
(expensive) news/public affairs programming (Baker 2002b, 8). Like clean water or
public highways, benefits accrue to society at large (“positive externalities”) that are not
captured by the market. Investigative journalism, for example, uncovering government
waste or a consumer scam benefits “even those who do not read the newspaper or
advertise on its pages” (Kimmelman, Scott, and Cooper 2006, 8). As Zaller put it, “For
every set of cases in which I am able to make plausible comparisons…market
competition [is] associated with lower levels of news quality” (in Fog 2004, 5).
Among the most disturbing market model developments has been the decline of a
fairness ethic in broadcasting. While the Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to
“afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance,”82 the market-model FCC takes a hands-off approach, interpreting the First
Amendment to preclude the Commission from “interfering with freedom of expression in
broadcasting.” Beyond categories of speech the Court has declared unprotected by the
First Amendment (incitement to imminent lawlessness, obscenity, child pornography,
libel, national security), only deliberate “hoaxes” and the “intentional falsification of the
news” will prompt an FCC content review (Media Bureau 2008). Though a full
assessment of the Doctrine, and broadcasters’ claims of a “chilling effect,” is beyond the
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scope of this paper, I argue (with Barron 1967) that it is “impossible to have the system
of licensing [in which broadcasters have privileged access to public airwaves] and take
the position that the broadcaster can operate in his private interest alone” (in Rainey
1993, 328, italics provided).
Because of their fundamental flaws (privileged, undisclosed broadcaster policy
influence; ad-reliance) both the trustee and market models are problematic. But, with its
severe indifference to political information, the market model relinquishes any
commitment to outcomes not expressed in terms of consumer preferences. Especially in
the market model’s extreme application, the 1996 Telecom Act, efficiencies unleashed
exorbitant deregulation (Howard 1997, 275), leading to historically unrivaled
consolidation, which created “industry giants like Clear Channel, with more than 1,200
stations” (Wexler 2005, 5), previously belonging to 70 formerly separate broadcast
companies (Boehlert 2001). Although garnering “unprecedented double-digit revenue
gains” for the largest radio owners (Radio’s Leading Indicator 2005, 4), the post-Act
consolidation sacrificed diversity and localism (Prindle 2003), slashed an estimated 56
percent of radio news reporting jobs (DiCola 2006, 23), and, diminished local
news/public affairs on commercial radio (Boehlert 2001; Folami 2010). This risks lost
commitments to democratic ideals—including fairness—which inhere in the public
interest.
C. Radio’s Unique Qualities and Democratic Potential
Since its emergence, radio has always been uniquely capable of immediate, direct
contact with masses of people, free of the “ideological apparatuses” of the state, as
Bertolt Brecht put it. And, although radio was never fully implemented as the idyllic two57

way channel Brecht advocated in his radio experiments of the 1920s, the medium has
been a pillar of community building—combining “entertainment and democracy, sound
and citizenship” (Hartley 2000, 155). Because of its accessibility, affordability, and
ubiquity, radio has been a stage for challenges to the status quo in the U.S. and around the
world. The advent of new media does nothing to erase the democratic possibilities of
radio.
So accessible, affordable, and potentially pervasive is radio, that it has been a
global mechanism for growing civil society. Non-governmental organizations in
developing countries, for example, broadcast life-saving information by radio during
crises or epidemics. In post-Apartheid South Africa, distribution of wind-up radios
facilitated political communication to areas where rural, poor residents had no access to
electricity (Inventor 2007). And, for the Aboriginals and Islanders of Australia, low-cost,
low-tech radio became a bridge for communities through dozens of local stations
“necklaced together” into an alternative broadcast service for indigenous peoples (Hartley
2000).
Even within the commercialized framework of American broadcasting, radio was
seen at its emergence as a vehicle through which “marginalized populations could be
included in America’s democracy by using the expressive and deliberative space” of the
airwaves (Folami 2010, 142). Most amateurs, of which there were nearly 15,000 by 1922,
frowned on passive listening. “Most of them believed that radio should be an active
medium of communication” (Lubar 1993, 214). And, since no natural reason existed,
other than political influence, for American radio to be dominated by a few commercial
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broadcasters in the early twentieth century, public dissatisfaction attended the early
entrenchment of networks (McChesney 1993, Barnouw 1966).
However, regulatory intervention curtailing network dominance (see Radio
Regulation, Chain Broadcasting Rules, 1941) recalled the democratic possibilities of
radio. Remotely provided, top-down programming gave ground to formerly marginalized
“voices of resistance” to mainstream norms and values. Local disc jockeys, tapping into
the longings of “unacknowledged youths” by playing their music on the radio and
announcing local events, gave voice to “concerns and interests that were otherwise
rendered invisible by dominant media outlets.” Especially notable was radio’s challenge
to mainstream ideologies that prohibited racial mingling—as when Black rhythm and
blues infused White rock and roll in the late 1940s and 1950s (Folami 2010, 145).
Compared to print, television, and the Internet, radio is more accessible, userfriendly, and is complementary to other activities. If staffed by local employees, radio can
convey immediate, local, widely dispersed information (whether entertainment,
emergency, or political) with timeliness and penetration unrivaled by more cumbersome
media forms. Moreover, because it “spares its listeners and performers from distracting
visual artifices,” radio can be a more “contemplative medium” that invites “greater
imaginative and intellectual involvement” than television (Sussman 1997, 94).
In light of the historical role ascribed to the press, which today includes electronic
media, and the special qualities of radio (capacity for immediate, direct contact with
publics—local, remote or disenfranchised; accessibility, affordability, ubiquity,
simplicity), radio can make a distinctive contribution to news/public affairs. Rather than
merely serving almost exclusively as profit centers for large corporations, radio stations
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can perform an essential political role—often more effectively and democratically than
other media. And, as I show in part IV, Portland stations often routinely carried out such
a role—even, to some extent, under the early market model—prior to the Telecom Act.
With an ear toward citizens’ concerns arising from the Habermassian wild complex
(mentioned in part II), radio can mediate the information flow between citizens and their
representatives. It can direct public attention to important issues, and foster opportunities
for citizens to act in concert by publicizing their projects. It can inform and engage
listeners, enhancing their political resources, and thus their chance of equal consideration
in the distribution of societal goods.
This section supports the second underlying premise of my paper: when linked to
communities through local news/public affairs, radio’s contribution to democracy is
unique. Hence I am suggesting that the removal of public interest safeguards in media
policy (which connected radio outlets to local communities) is a loss for democracy—a
thick thread snipped from the fabric of local social life. In part IV, I will take up the third
premise, that the extreme application of the market model, the Telecom Act, diminished
local news/public affairs, and consequently, democratic opportunities for Portland radio
listeners.
D. Why Radio Still Matters in the Internet Era
Advocates for the market model argue that because consumers have “more choice
from more sources” than at any time in the history of communications (e.g. Internet,
cable, satellite), worries about the market model and concentrated media ownership are
unfounded (Compaine 2005, 1). Under scrutiny, though, this argument is flawed on
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several grounds: namely, the transfer of old-media ownership patterns to new media;
limited digital access and efficacy; and, the Internet’s atomizing effect.
First, ownership patterns dominant in traditional media have been transferred to
the Internet (Napoli 2007, 19). More often than not, people seeking their news online are
turning to the Internet version of the same material produced by traditional media sources
elsewhere (Blosser, et al. 2007, 8). As the Pew Project found (2010), “80 percent of
traffic to news and information sites is concentrated at the top seven percent of sites,” and
“ the vast majority of those sites (67 percent) are still tied to legacy media” (Pew 2010,
3). Thus, even if traditional sources were not sought, they would likely be found, since
“Internet sites are aggregators of the news gathered by old media rather than producers of
[their own] news content” (McChesney and Nichols 2010, 16).
Second, although great strides have been made in expanding broadband access
(Implementing 2011), the Internet is not available to everyone, and most people still rely
heavily on traditional media sources (Pew 2010, 3). And, even though anyone with access
and computer savvy can set up a website and send information to the world, his or her
ability to have a message heard, or “enter the public’s awareness,” is severely limited
compared to the relative power of established media (Schwartzman, Leanza, and Feld
2008). Moreover, while the Internet and other digital options have replaced scarcity with
relative abundance (Huber 1997, 137), it is still not possible for everyone to broadcast at
the same time. Thus entrenched broadcast interests remain at a distinct speech advantage
(since more than 90 percent of Americans hear the radio), in violation of the long-held
premise that citizens’ rights are prior to those of broadcasters’ (Cook 2005a, 178).
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Finally, and perhaps most important to democracy, all Internet virtues aside, it “has
vices as well.”
Although millions of people are using the Internet to expand their horizons,
many people are doing the opposite, creating a Daily Me that is specifically
tailored to their own interests and prejudices. Whatever the exact numbers,
it is important to realize that a well-functioning democracy—a republic—
depends not just on freedom from censorship, but also on a set of common
experiences and on unsought, unanticipated, and even unwanted exposures
to diverse topics, people, and ideas. A system of ‘gated communities’ is as
unhealthy for cyberspace as it is for the real world. (Sunstein 2001, 2)
Sunstein’s thought experiment in Republic.com (2002), in which everyone has a personal
communications universe echoes anti-federalist, Tocquevillian, Deweyan, Delli
Carpinian, and others’ concerns with community linkage. While increasing the variety of
perspectives available, the Internet also offers “unprecedented opportunities to narrow
the range of viewpoints one encounters” (Mangarian 2008, 848). The present era of
political polarization suggests a need for more—not fewer—opportunities to “act in
concert,” and to “realize every day [our] mutual dependence.” 83
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Part IV. Presentation of the Research: The View from Portland
Having offered support for this paper’s first two propositions (that democracy
depends on political information distribution, and that radio can uniquely contribute to
that distribution through news/public affairs), I turn to the third premise: that the 1996
Telecom Act specifically impaired local radio news/public affairs. Keeping in mind
themes found in the literature (summarized in part II), I searched for comparable Act
effects in Portland. If the Act impacted Portland radio as it did stations nationwide, I
reasoned, I would find parallel trends: fewer owners, lost journalism jobs, and diminished
news/public affairs. Using the research methods described in part II, here is what I found.
A. Fewer Owners in Portland
Just as the Act prompted sharp ownership consolidation nationwide, similar
ownership patterns prevailed in Portland in the post-Act years. As Appendix B shows, 30
different entities owned 40 stations in 1996.84 By 2011, though three new stations had
entered the market,85 the number of owners had declined significantly, to only 21, a
decrease of 30 percent.
Even more striking is the market dominance of just one company, Clear Channel,
in Portland. Although 21 Portland owners are licensed in the Portland area, many are
small special-interest projects—such as religious or Spanish language stations—enjoyed
by a fraction of the audience so small they barely register on ratings charts (See
Appendix C).86 By contrast, an examination of the top 12 stations indicates the vast radio
terrain now controlled by just a few owners. For example, in 1996-97, the top-rated 12
stations controlling the bulk of the audience were owned by seven different companies
(Appendix D). In 2011, only three companies own all dozen top commercial stations
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(Appendix E).87 Viewed another way, taking into account only the top five commercial
stations, just two owners reign: Not counting the popular publicly owned station, KOPB,
Clear Channel owns four of the top five commercial stations—a commanding and highly
profitable market position.
Arbitron (2005) points out, “the top five ranking stations [in any average market
nationwide] net 39 percent of radio revenues,” meaning that “heavy hitters take a
disproportionate share of radio revenue” (Radio’s Leading Indicator 2005, 10). One
study (2003), produced but not released by the FCC’s Media Bureau,88 found the revenue
benefits to market dominance even more pronounced: “[T]he largest firm in each radio
metro market has, on average, 46 percent of the market’s total radio advertising revenue,”
and the “largest two firms in each radio market have, on average, 74 percent of the
market’s radio advertising revenue” (Blevins and Brown 2010, 613). This offers media
companies tremendous incentive to form market clusters, as Entercom describes in the
jobs section below. In a moment, I examine whether market clusters lead to diminished
news public affairs through the use of shared content.
B. Jobs Wiped Out in Portland
With the dramatic loss (more than half) of radio journalism jobs nationwide
(DiCola 2006a, 23), I wanted to gauge jobs lost to the Act in Portland. That turned out to
be tricky, since radio employees are frequently jacks-of-all-trades, performing multiple
functions. Hence I offer findings, derived from SEC annual reports, which represent
employees overall, not just broadcast journalists. Employing two of my station pairs, here
is what I found.89
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Clear Channel, which had a national average of 27.6 employees per station
nationwide at the end of 1996, had cut that number to 14.5 employees per station in 2009,
a 47 percent drop since the Act was approved (see table 4).90 If Portland’s Clear Channel
stations are typical, their staffs have been cut by nearly half (see appendix I). If half of
radio news jobs nationwide were lost to the Act, it stands to reason a large portion of the
wiped out Portland jobs would have been those of journalists.
Table 4.
Clear Channel

Dec., 1996

U.S. Stations
U.S. Employees
Average Employees per station

Dec., 2009

86

894

2,377

12,984

27.6

14.5

Source: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, see n85.

Entercom demonstrated a less severe decline in the number of workers. With 41
stations in 1998 (the oldest year for which data was available), Entercom employed 684
full-time and 250 part-time workers—a per-station average of 16.68 fulltime and 6.1 parttime employees. 91 By November, 2009 (with 110 stations), the company employed 1,560
full-time and 750 part-time workers—a per-station average of 14.18 full-time and 6.8
part-time employees (see table 5). 92 This represents a 15 percent decline in full-time
workers, while the use of part-timers went up by 11 percent. (Note that, since KWJJ was
not owned by Entercom in 1998, suggested job patterns would not apply.)93
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Table 5.
Entercom*

May, 1998

U.S. Stations

41

Nov. 2009
110

U.S. Employees

FT
684
PT
250
Average Employees per station:
FT
PT

16.68
6.1

1,560
750
14.8
6.8

*Note: Entercom did not own KWJJ in 1998.
Source: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, see n86, n87.

A number of factors could have influenced the appearance of a milder staff
reduction at Entercom; most obviously, available data begins in May 1998, two years
after the Act. This suggests Act-related staff cuts may have already taken place, although
I am unable to show that here. However, Entercom’s S-1 filing (1998) with the SEC
discusses some possibilities along this line, stating:
Since October 1, 1996, the company…has acquired or agreed to acquire
36 radio stations, and has divested or agreed to divest, for strategic reasons,
nine radio stations. …As a result of these transactions, the company has
divested its stand-alone stations, while establishing the largest clusters in
Seattle and Kansas City, and building superduoplies in Boston, Portland
[OR], Sacramento, and Rochester. …The company believes that its proven
record of consummating creative transactions…positions it well to
continue to participate in the consolidation occurring in its industry.”94
The report also states that Entercom “generated 97.6 percent of its pro forma fiscal 1997
net revenues from superduopolies…clusters of four or more stations in one market.” To
“enhance newly acquired underperforming stations,” Entercom uses a variety of
techniques, including “management enhancements, expenditure reductions, facility
consolidation…” All this, familiar economies of scale, would suggest Portland lost
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significant numbers of Entercom jobs in the aftermath of the Telecom Act, and that
average per-station Entercom jobs continued to decline after 1998.95
Before moving on to the comments of local broadcasters, note that I do not make
a jobs comparison using the Alpha-owned stations, since both KINK and KUPL changed
hands several times in the months following the Act, and were ultimately purchased
(2009) by a newly formed broadcast entity (Alpha). Thus, my method of assessing perstation employee averages by drawing from company data over time would not apply.
Supporting the evidence of lost local radio news jobs is my Radio Survey 2011
(Appendix F), which indicates local professionals have noticed severe staff cuts. One
radio veteran said:
The consolidation of radio resulted in drastic staff reductions and
eliminated quality local [programming]. The station I have worked at for
23 years went from a thriving local business that provided above average
wages and excellent benefits to its staff to a corporate cash cow in a matter
of a few brief years. (Radio Survey 2011, Q. 17, response 10)
Another thought staff cutbacks had led to a frenetic work environment: “There are so few
workers, everyone is rushing around just trying to fill the time with anything to keep the
needles moving.”96 To others, low staffing impaired their ability to produce in-depth
stories: “[W]ith limited staffing, more quick and frequent newscasts, and growing
responsibilities on our websites, it is increasingly difficult to really dig into topics.”
This underlines the link between broadcast news jobs and important political functions
news media traditionally perform, a concern of the next section.
C. Diminished Local News/Public Affairs in Portland
In the absence of an unattainable content analysis (no adequate pre-Act air sample
exists), my attempt to demonstrate diminished local news/public affairs relies on much
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the same data found in national assessments: lost jobs (see above section), a listener shift
to public broadcasting, and shared content. In addition, I will offer findings from station
public files documenting that news/public affairs declined in the Act’s wake, and
broadcasters’ own accounts that their political role is truncated.
Just as the bump to NPR’s audience was viewed as a thirst for more or higherquality political information (Kamenetz 2009), Portland-area radio listeners have shifted
in droves to KOPB, the primary non-commercial radio station, since the Act (see
Appendix L). While hovering around 10th place in the late 1990s ratings, KOPB
improved its market position radically in 2001, where it has remained at or near the top in
the ensuing years. This transition may have been due, at least in part, to dissatisfaction
with news/public affairs offerings on local commercial stations (Sense of Place 2006).
It is indisputable that content has been increasingly shared over Portland’s
airwaves in the years following the 1996 Act, sometimes enabled by advances in
technology (e.g. voice-tracking). However, such content is of concern here only to the
degree that it displaces or distorts local news/public affairs. Content that merely “seems
local” implies a loss in both the localism and diversity of news/public affairs. But,
although listeners have posted complaints online about apparent voice-tracking97 the
extent of voice-tracked content apparently has not been studied. Other forms of shared
content are reported in station public files and by broadcasters themselves.
Since Act-induced consolidation, news/public affairs programming has declined
on Portland radio; what remains is less local; and more of the locally produced content is
shared (See Appendices J, K, and M). For example, in 1998, KWJJ 99.5 (then owned by
Fisher Broadcasting) produced its own unique public affairs programming. As part of the
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Entercom cluster, KWJJ airs the same public affairs programs as KGON 92.3 and
Entercom’s other stations, sometimes at the same time (see Appendix M). In fact, locally
produced Metroscope, is heard on all six of Entercom’s Portland stations,98 as are the
nationally syndicated Viewpoints and Radio Health Journal.
The practice of sharing public affairs programs within a cluster is far from
unusual. Clear Channel, for example, shares its locally produced 30-minute Sunday
Magazine among its cluster stations (four out of five of which run it at 7:00 AM
Sundays). It also airs (and shares) Viewpoints, with the same content often being
presented at precisely the same time. Sunday mornings at 7:30 AM, for example, at least
three of Clear Channel’s Portland stations, KXJM 107.5, KFBW 105.9, and KLTH 106.7,
all broadcast Viewpoints. And since Entercom also runs Viewpoints on KGON 92.3 on
Sunday mornings at 7:30, that brings to four the number of Portland stations airing
Viewpoints, with the same subject matter, at the same time every week.99 In all, ten
Portland stations run the same Viewpoints show at various times on the same day! Other
such examples are shown in Appendix M.
While many public affairs programs have long been banished to the smallaudience wilderness of early Sunday mornings or late Sunday nights, at least on nonnews stations, their recent morphing into near lock-step content is a post-Telecom Act
phenomenon. Because many of these stations in the Entercom and Clear Channel clusters
had separate owners prior to the Act, they produced distinctive public affairs content that
is homogenized today. Appendices J and K contrast news/public affairs content on
KGON and KWJJ during the late 1990s with that of 2011. When station clusters air the
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same content in the same market, the number of perspectives—otherwise contained in
broadcasts produced by diverse sources—necessarily shrinks.
The second shared-content concern is with pre-produced content. Public relations
professionals have long provided media with “information subsidies” (Gandy 1982), in
an effort to “intentionally shape the news agenda by reducing journalists’ costs of
gathering information” (Berkowitz and Adams 1990). While individual journalists may
resist (Curtin 1999), the acceptance and use of information subsidies has increased with
the rise of market imperatives in news production (Underwood 1993; McManus 1994).
Such supplements, ever more-sophisticated, enable media conglomerates to
“synergistically” package a single idea across multiple platforms.
In the corporate dreams of media giants, synergy occurs when, for
example, a magazine writes about an author, whose book is converted into
a movie, (the CD soundtrack of which is played on radio stations), which
becomes the basis for a television series which has its own Web site and
computer games. (Croteau and Hoynes 2006, 78)
Promotional media products are appealing to broadcast journalists under pressure to
produce more “news” for more stations, since they come specifically packaged for quick
insertion into newscasts—complete with scripts and edited sound cuts. And, while useful
information is no doubt contained in many such subsidies, democracy is diminished when
news/public affairs is supplanted by what is essentially, subtly, a commercial. As
Bagdikian puts it, in his disturbing account of five conglomerations dominating the media
landscape,100 “media products are unique [in that] they manufacture a social and political
world (Bagdikian 2004, 9).
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Radio Survey 2011 found large majorities of broadcast news professionals
indicating they had shared more content, and used more content provided to them in
recent years.101
Table 6.
As an on-air radio employee, are/were your news/public affairs stories shared more with
another station(s) in recent years?
Yes: 11
No: 5
Table 7.
As a staff member (on or off the air) do/did you use more shared content (produced
elsewhere in your company or parent company) in recent years?
Yes: 12
No: 3

Note that the nature of the shared content was unspecified, and could have referred to a
variety of information subsidies, or to original material.
It is not only media giants that have decreased staff and homogenized content. In
a sort of role reversal, Alpha Broadcasting, a newly formed local company (2009)
purchased several Portland stations and pared news/public affairs offerings that had been
spared even by CBS and other previous owners. At KUPL 98.7, for example, time
devoted to local public affairs was cut in half, from an hour to 30 minutes. And, several
public affairs features were dropped from KINK 101.9, including a national one-hour
Newsweek Magazine summary of world and national events, as well as shorter pieces of
about two minutes each: Kink Considers, a unique local analysis or commentary on a
pressing public concern; Homepage, a family-issues segment; Discovering the Great
Northwest, on natural resources; and Subject Earth, a brief environmental report.
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According to station public files, the only retained public affairs program on KINK, after
its sale to Alpha, was Speaking Freely, a 30-minute local program.102
In what may have been the biggest democratic loss for local organizations after
the Act, many Portland stations dropped small-event public service announcements
(PSAs). Rather than publicizing scores of neighborhood happenings every week, stations
trended toward fewer, larger events. The most conspicuous contrast between pre-Actstyle PSAs and events publicized after Act-spurred consolidation is shown in Appendix
K. KWJJ’s formerly eclectic daily announcements for myriad local groups were replaced
by just two (larger- scale) events per quarter. This trend—away from small local-event
publicity—toward fewer, larger promotions was common at Portland stations, according
to public files and email inquiries to radio staff.
Although worthy organizations are among the few (but sizeable) radio-supported
public service events, the exclusion of PSAs for spaghetti-feeds, photo exhibits, sports
meets, and local Chamber of Commerce fundraisers is a toll on the ability of local groups
to spread word of their projects. Supplanted by station-cluster mega-events, smaller
projects found diminishing radio opportunities for publicity. Since democracy depends on
political information, and radio channels are non-substitutable, this was apparently a
trend away from democratic opportunities.
Although two Radio Survey 2011 participants thought the amount of local
news/public affairs on Portland radio was the “right amount,” 14 others thought “not
enough” was provided.
Table 8.
As you see it, in terms of providing the public with an adequate source of local news/public affairs,
Portland stations offer:
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Too much:
Right amount:
Not enough:
Don’t know:

0
2
14
0

And, 16 out of 17 participants thought “less time is now being allocated for local
news/public affairs on local radio.” As to reasons for the apparent decline, respondents
were asked to choose a weighted response indicating, on a scale of 1 – 10, the
significance of several possible reasons:
Ownership efforts to reduce cost.
Buy-outs by larger media companies.
Audiences prefer non-news (entertainment).
People can get local news elsewhere (TV, Internet, etc.).
Other (please specify).
Not surprisingly, many participants thought, as shown in the graphs below, that
ownership efforts to reduce costs and media company buy-outs were major reasons for
diminished news/public affairs content (Figures 2 and 3).

Figure 2.
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Figure 3.

It is also noteworthy, though, that several broadcasters thought preferences for “non-news
(entertainment)” and access to news “elsewhere (TV, Internet, etc.)” were factors in radio
providing less news/pubic affairs.
Figure 4.
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Figure 5.

Worrisome, though, from the standpoint of a political role for radio news/public
affairs was a strong consensus among local news broadcasters that the “current media
environment” impinged on their ability to convey important news subjects to their
audience—setting the agenda. Question 14 asked respondents to say whether they agreed
or disagreed, and how strongly with the following statement: “As a broadcast journalist, I
feel my ability to communicate important news subjects to my listening audience is
limited in the current media environment.”
Figure 6.
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As figure 6 shows, 11 out of 15 broadcast journalists felt strongly that their agendasetting ability was hampered by current conditions in radio news. Said one, “Public
service and news should help listeners participate in our cherished free and open
society…bring them into the “process” of democracy, so to speak; and help them make
informed decisions in all areas of political and community discourse” (Appendix F).
D. Conclusions
Since the post-Act rash of consolidation, economic constraints have increasingly
shaped radio’s political role, and the ability of broadcast journalists’ to facilitate politics,
highlight key issues, and provide a forum. The Act-prompted streamlining of station
ownership ejected many thousands from jobs that specifically linked listeners to their
communities and their representatives, sometimes replacing original news/public affairs
with less-local content possibly formulated hundreds or even thousands of miles away.
By 2005, “most local radio stations…offer[ed] virtually nothing in the way of reporters in
the field” (Pew 2006). Gone were many institutional aspects of the broadcast journalist’s
job, “beat” coverage of local matters such as school board and city council meetings.
Diminished, too, were many radio opportunities for communication about countless local
events.
If Radio Survey 2011 is representative, most post-Act Portland radio journalists
became more reliant on centralized, shared, or other low-budget content, than on (more
costly) thoughtful, original, or investigative journalism. If lost jobs indicate fewer content
decisions were made by local residents, news judgments following the Act were
increasingly made elsewhere—diminishing the local in news/public affairs. The public
discourse opportunities radio can offer are mocked by its conversion into a mere
76

marketing vehicle for commodities, especially in Portland with its active utilization of
political information.
True, technological advances (digital and portable options, Satellite radio) and
economic pressures had already set in motion, prior to the Act, a decline in traditional
radio news/public affairs (See part II, fig. 1, p. 27). That the Act exacerbated market
model outcomes is apparent, though measuring them is an imprecise enterprise. My
purpose here was to show that, whatever democratic opportunities radio may have
offered before the Act, however narrowed by market imperatives they may have been,
those opportunities were further weakened or eliminated because of the Act. If selfgovernance thrives on political information (as I argued in part II), and if radio is a nonsubstitutable channel (as I argued in part III), consequences of the Telecom Act become
important to democracy.
Because nearly everyone listens to the radio, even if passively, and its messages
can influence thought, broadcast content matters. It “just comes in,” as one researcher
described the saturation of media content—in homes and cars, in stores and malls, on
phones and billboards, in films and popular music, at workplaces—even for those who
make little effort to seek out media (McCombs and Shaw 1972, 177). In contrast,
although information proliferates in the digital world, one may easily avoid unwanted
Internet content. Thus the Internet—with its atomizing tendencies—is no substitute for
democratic radio communication. At the very least, post-Act citizens may be less
informed than they would be under a broadcast media policy aimed at engaged, informed
citizens. Evidence presented here is consistent with the growing body of research
indicating economic interests impinge on democratic discourse.
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This paper offers support for the return of abandoned community links articulated
in, if imperfectly manifested by, the trustee model. The consequences of vanished
institutional mechanisms (e.g. locally generated content, staffed news departments)
documented in study after study are a loss to democracy, at a time when cynicism and
polarized rhetoric characterize the public sphere. As Greider saw, “if the public
sometimes seems dumb, it is because no institution takes responsibility for teaching them
or for listening to them” (Greider 1993, 21). If Swanson (2000) is correct, shifting
broadcast journalism away from commercial radio stations contributes to a class division
of political information “haves” and “have nots.”
An affirmative interpretation of the First Amendment, as Justice Stewart
suggested, would enable institutional support for the mediating role of broadcast
journalism. Such safeguarding becomes more critical with few private interests in
control of most mass channels of speech and thought: newspapers, television,
radio, cable, satellite, music, books, and film—and their corresponding digital
presence on the Internet. As Justice Black put it:
It would be strange if the grave concern for freedom of the press which
prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command
that the government was without power to protect that freedom…essential
to the welfare of the public…Freedom of the press from governmental
interference…does not sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests.103
Justice White declared, the public has a right “to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas”,104 but such access is presently limited
on commercial radio by market efficiencies.
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Perhaps most compelling is the need to place media policy on the public
agenda. Indications are unmistakable that broadcast entities, through their
powerful lobby apparatus, infinite station network, and apparent capture of
officials and regulators, have been willing to withhold crucial details of media
policy from the public (Barnouw 1966; Blevins and Brown 2010; Boehlert 2001;
Dunbar 2006; McChesney 1993; Snider 2005; Stern 1996). This is a serious
violation of the historic trust U.S. society has placed in broadcasters. Whether
concerning main studio rules or ownership concentration, media policy should be
subject to full democratic debate and decisions.
Of course, the public en masse was largely unaware of the 1996 Telecom Act; if
its information source was mass media, how would it have known? When reported at all,
mostly in print, the Act was covered “as a business story [about cable and phone rates]
not a public policy story,” though it would have an enormous impact on daily life
(Wexler 2005, 7). This suggests a return to pre-1996 limits on media ownership, to allow
for public debate on radio consolidation and its now-demonstrable effects. As Copps
(2002) wondered, “ How can we possibly know if licensees are serving their communities
without hearing from the community?” (Copps, 2004).
Tocqueville suggested, when ruling power is more “energetic and
powerful…and when private individuals are more lethargic,” useful social
conventions are more necessary (Tocqueville [1840] 2003, 813). Because today
market power reigns, I argue here for the return of such conventions, as embodied
by local broadcast journalists. Though the public interest may be an almostmythical concept, restoring living, breathing humans to the radio newsroom is a
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real possibility—one that could restore a vibrant communication channel to the
fabric of social life.
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Notes
1

See Telecommunications Act of 1996, http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html

2

Unless otherwise specified, use of the term “radio” in this paper will always refer to commercial,
advertiser-supported radio, as distinct from publicly subsidized, non-commercial radio.
3

Although talk radio formats (“news/talk/information”) enjoy significant listenership (Radio Today 2010)
and are frequently focused on political topics (Pew 2011), they would be counted as political, for purposes
of this paper, only to the extent that they fulfilled the political functions described (information facilitation
between citizens and representatives; directing attention to important stories; offering a discussion
platform).
4

For the social-historical circumstances that contributed to the rise of media market forces (weakening U.S.
economy, corporate transnationalism), see Sussman 1997, esp. 13-14, 100-113. For the decline of
news/public affairs, see McChesney and Nichols 2010, 31; Keith 2007, 19; FCC Working Group 2011, 60.
Many stations began scaling back their local news/public affairs programming after the FCC stopped
requiring it in 1981. At the same time, new portable audio devices presented radio with new entertainmentonly competition, further discouraging informational programming. See Chen 1998.
5

http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/news?region=us

6

For a detailed analysis of mainstream journalism’s degradation, and restorative initiatives calibrated to
traditional news values, especially for print media, see McChesney Nichols 2010.
7

After publishing its nine-element list in 2006, Kovach and Rosenstiel added the 10th element, citizen
responsibilities, in their 2007 edition. See Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007.
8

RTDNA (formerly RTNDA, the Radio Television News Directors Assn.) lists truth, fairness, integrity,
accountability, and so on, at its website, http://www.rtdna.org/pages/media_items/code-of-ethics-andprofessional-conduct48.php?id=48. For SPJ’s similar ethics statement, see
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp. Both accessed August 29, 2011.
9

Stewart and Colbert are but two examples of the political/satirical breed of journalism/activism
flourishing in broadcast, in print, and online. For the subversive manipulation of spectacular images,
“culture jamming,” the “Yes Men,” and The Onion, see Farrar and Warner, 2008.
10

As Carter and Stelter (2010) note, Edward R. Murrow turned public opinion against the excesses of Sen.
Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s. And, a Walter Cronkite editorial helped convince President Johnson he had
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Appendix A

FCC 1960 Programming Policy Statement
“The major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs and desires of
the community in which the station is located as developed by the industry, and
recognized by the Commission, have included:
1. Opportunity for Local Self-Expression
2. Development and Use of Local Talent
3. Programs for Children
4. Religious Programs
5. Educational Programs
6. Public Affairs Programs
7. Editorialization by Licensees
8. Political Broadcasts
9. Agricultural Programs
10. News Programs
11. Weather and Market Reports
12. Sports Programs
13. Service to Minority Groups
14. Entertainment Programming
The elements set out above are neither all-embracing nor constant. …The ascertainment
of the needed elements of the broadcast matter to be provided by a particular licensee for
the audience he is obligated to serve remains primarily the function of the licensee.”
Excerpts from FCC 1960 Programming Policy Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960). Source:
Krasnow and Goodman 1998, 615-6, and Kahn 1984, 200-1.
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Appendix B
PORTLAND STATIONS OWNERSHIP HISTORY

1996 – 2011

1996 = 40 stations

2011 = 43 stations

1996 = 30 owners

2011 = 21 owners

AM Stations
1. 620 KPOJ Embarcadero Media, Inc.
[EXCL Communications, Inc. / 2-20-97]
[Jacor Communications, Inc. / 2-25-97]
[Clear Channel Communications, Inc. / 5-4-99]
current 2011
2. 750 KXL Alexander Broadcasting Co., Inc.
[Rose City Radio Corp. / 11-30-98]
[Alpha Broadcasting / announced 5-12-09]
current 2011

(KPOJ)
(KXTG)

3. 800 KPDQ Salem Communications Corp.

(KPDQ)

4. 860 KPAM Pamplin Communications Corp.
current 2011 (signed on Oct., 1997)

(KPAM)

5. 910 KKSN Heritage Media Corp.
[Fox - News Corporation / 3-17-97]
[Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. / 7-16-97]
[Entercom Radio, LLC / 3-1-98]
current 2011

(KTRO)

6. 940 KWBY
[94 Country Inc.] current 2011
7. 970 KBBT Henry Broadcasting Co.
(KUFO)
[American Radio Systems License Corp. / 5-20-96]
[Infinity Broadcasting Corp. / 6-4-98]
[CBS Radio Stations, Inc. / 12-14-05]
[Alpha Broadcasting] current 2011
8. 1010 KXYQ Spartan Media, Inc.
[KGUY, LLC / 3-28-00]
[Northwest Radio Broadcasting Co. / 12-4-01]
[Bustos Media, LLC / 10-29-03]
(KOOR)
[Adelante Media] current 2011
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9. 1040 KXPD
[Churchill Media] current 2011
10. 1080 KWJJ Park Communications, Inc.
[Fisher Broadcasting, Inc. / 5-8-96]
[Entercom Communications Corp. / 12-18-03] (KFXX )
current 2011
11. 1150 KKEY Western Broadcasting Co.
[Western Broadcasting Co. / 3-1-98]
[Western Broadcasting Co. / 7-29-99]
[Bustos Media, LLC / 8-21-03]
[Adelante Media/2011]
current 2011

(KXET)

12. 1190 KEX Citicasters, Inc.
[Jacor Communications, Inc. / 12-31-96]
[Clear Channel Communications, Inc. / 5-4-99]

(KEX)

13. 1230 (KMUZ) KRYN
[Bustos Media 5-3-03]
[Salem Folklore Community 2008]
[Adelante Media] current 2011
14. 1330 KKPZ Crawford Broadcasting Co.
[KPHP Radio] current 2011

(KKPZ)

15. 1360 KUIK Dolphin Communications, Inc.
[Westside Radio, Inc. / 7-1-08]
(KUIK)
16. 1410 AM 2nd Amendment Foundation
[KBNP Radio] current 2011
17. 1450 KBPS Portland Public Schools
18. 1480 KBMS Vancouver, WA
[Christopher Bennett Broadcasting]
current 2011
19. 1520 KFXX [Fisher to Entercom 2003]
[Adelante Media of OR]
current 2011

(KGDD)

20. 1550 KVAN Vancouveradio, Inc.
[Pamplin Communications Corp. / 11-20-98]
(KKAD)
[Pamplin/Alexandra/comopadres/Centro Cristiano]
[Vernon Snyder] current 2011
21. 1640 KKJY Crawford Broadcasting Co.
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[Radio Disney Group, LLC / 2-16-03]
(KDZR)
current 2011
** signed on, May, 1998

FM Stations
22. 88.3 Non-commercial, Catholic
[Catholic Broadcasting NW] current 2011

(KBVM)

23. 89.1 KMHD Non-commercial, Ed.
[Mt. Hood Community College] current 2011
24. 89.9 KQAC Non-commercial, Ed.
[All Classical Public Media, Inc.]
current 2011
25. 90.7 KBOO Non-commercial, Ed.
[The KBOO Foundation]
current 2011
26. 91.5 KOPB Non-commercial, Ed.
[Oregon Public Broadcasting]
current 2011
27. 92.3 KGON Entercom Radio, LLC
current 2011

(KGON)

28. 93.1 KAST-FM Youngs Bay Broadcasting (Note: Astoria station until 2006)
[New Northwest Broadcasters, Inc. / 10-26-99]
(signed on from Gladstone Feb 1, 06)
[Salem Communications Corp. / 11-9-04]
(KRYP)
[Ohana Media Group 2009]
[Salem Media] current 2011
29. 93.9 KPDQ-FM Salem Communications Corp.

(KPDQ-FM)

30. 94.7 KNRK Entercom Radio, LLC
current 2011

(KNRK)

31. 95.5 KXL-FM Alexander Broadcasting Co., Inc.
[Rose City Radio Corp. / 11-30-98]
[Alpha Broadcasting]
(KXTG)
current 2011
32. 97.1 KKSN-FM Heritage Media Corp.
[Fox - News Corporation / 3-17-97]
[Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. / 7-16-97]
[Entercom Radio, LLC / 3-1-98]

(KYCH)
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current 2011
33. 98.7 KUPL-FM Baycom
[American Radio Systems License Corp. / 8-1-96]
[Infinity Broadcasting Corp. / 6-4-98]
[CBS Radio Stations, Inc. / 12-14-05]
(KUPL)
[Alpha Broadcasting/2009] current 2011
34. 99.5 KWJJ-FM Park Communications, Inc.
[Fisher Broadcasting, Inc. / 5-8-96]
[Entercom Communications Corp. / 12-18-03]
current 2011

(KWJJ)

35. 100.3 KKRZ Citicasters, Inc.
[Jacor Communications
[Clear Channel Communications, Inc. / 5-4-99] (KKRZ)
current 2011
36. 101.1 KUFO Henry Broadcasting Co.
[American Radio Systems License Corp. / 5-20-96]
[Infinity Broadcasting Corp. / 6-4-98]
[CBS Radio Stations, Inc. / 12-14-05]
(KXL)
[Alpha/2009]
current 2011
37. 101.9 KINK Embarcadero Media, Inc.
[EXCL Communications, Inc. / 2-20-97]
[American Radio Systems License Corp. / 5-15-98]
[Infinity Broadcasting Corp./ 5-27-98]
[CBS Radio Stations, Inc. / 12-14-05]
(KINK)
[Alpha/2009]
current 2011
38. 103.3 KKCW Citicasters, Inc.
[Jacor Communications, Inc. / 12-31-96]
[Clear Channel Communications, Inc. / 5-4-99] (KKCW)
current 2011
39. 104.1 KFIS Oregon Eagle, Inc.
[Thunderegg Wireless, LLC / 2-4-99]
[Salem Communications Corp. / 9-20-01]
[Caron Broadcasting 2001]
[Horizon Broadcasting Group] current 2011
40. 105.1 KRSK Heritage Media Corp.
[Fox - News Corporation / 3-17-97]
[Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. / 7-16-97]
[Entercom Radio, LLC / 3-1-98]

(KWPK)

(KRSK)

41. 105.9 KFBW Citicasters, 1996
[acquired by Jacor]
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[acquired by Clear Channel ‘99]
current 2011

(KQOL)

42. 106.7 KLTH Baycom
[American Radio Systems License Corp. / 8-1-96]
[Infinity Broad [Infinity Broadcasting Corp. / 6-4-98]
[CBS Radio Stations, Inc. / 12-14-05]
[Clear Channel Communications, Inc./ 4-1-09]
(KLTH)
current 2011
43. 107.5 KDBX Salem Communication Corp.
[American Radio Systems License Corp. / 7-25-96]
[Infinity Broadcasting Corp. / 6-4-98]
[CBS Radio Stations, Inc. / 12-14-05]
[Clear Channel Communications, Inc./ 4-1-09] (KXJM)

**Note: Two AM stations, KPAM (860 AM) and KKJY/KDZR (1640 AM), along with
one FM KAST/KRYP (93.1 FM) were added to the Portland market since 1996.
As previously noted, station estimates vary for technical reasons (“signal contours”). This is a combined
estimate of station histories I could document.
Sources: http://licensing.fcc.gov/prod/cdbs/pubacc/prod/sta_sear.htm, http://home.recnet.com/? and
http://www.pdxradio.com/FM_AM_Owners.html
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PORTLAND, OR RADIO RANKER

Appendix C

Portland Stations Arbitron Ratings 2011

AQH Share for Persons 6+, Mon-Sun 6AM-Mid

Click on any column heading to sort by that field—ranking, outlet, format or survey period.

Station

Ranking

Format

Outlet

Mar.

Format

Apr.

MAR 11

May

APR 11

MAY 11

1
2
3
4t

KLTH-FM
KKCW-FM
KUPL-FM
KGON-FM

Classic Hits
Adult Contemporary
Country
Classic Rock

5.6
8.6
5.1
4.9

6.4
7.9
5.5
5.2

8.1
7.7
6.1
5.8

4t
6
7

KKRZ-FM
KXJM-FM
KOPB-FM

Hot Adult Contemporary
Pop Contemporary Hit Radio
News Talk Information

6.0
4.8
6.6

6.0
5.3
5.7

5.8
5.7
4.7

8
9
10t
10t

KINK-FM
KWJJ-FM
KFIS-FM
KYCH-FM

Album Adult Alternative
Country
Contemporary Christian
Adult Hits

4.0
3.8
3.1
3.2

4.0
4.3
4.2
4.0

4.5
4.4
4.2
4.2

12t
12t
14
15
16
17
18t

KFBW-FM
KRSK-FM
KEX-AM
KXL-AM
KNRK-FM
KRYP-FM
KQAC-FM

Classic Rock
Hot Adult Contemporary
News Talk Information
News Talk Information
Album Adult Alternative
Mexican Regional
Classical

5.0
2.6
3.1
2.6
3.0
2.6
2.3

4.7
3.1
3.2
3.0
3.1
2.9
2.3

4.0
4.0
3.5
3.3
2.9
2.6
1.9

18t
20

KXTG-FM
KFXX-AM

All Sports
All Sports

2.2
2.4

2.2
2.3

1.9
1.8

21
22
23
24
25t
25t
25t
28t

KMHD-FM
KPAM-AM
KUFO-AM
KPOJ-AM
KLVP-FM
KPDQ-FM
KZZR-FM
KPWX-AM

Jazz
News Talk Information
Talk/Personality
Talk/Personality
Contemporary Christian
Religious
Mexican Regional
Mexican Regional

1.9
1.2
0.9
1.1
0.5
1.2
0.4
0.7

1.3
0.9
1.1
1.0
0.7
1.0
0.7
0.5

1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.6

28t
30t
30t
32t
32t
32t
32t
32t

KSND-FM
KFIS-FM Stream
KWIP-AM
KFBW-FM HD2
KHPE-FM
KINK-FM Stream
KWBY-AM
KXET-AM

Spanish Adult Hits
Contemporary Christian
Mexican Regional
Classic Hits
Contemporary Christian
Album Adult Alternative
Mexican Regional
Spanish Contemporary

0.7
*
0.3
*
0.4
*
0.3
0.5

0.7
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.5
*
0.2
0.3

0.6
0.5
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3

32t
32t
39t
39t
39t
39t
39t
44

KYKN-AM
KZRI-FM
KBOO-FM
KGDD-AM
KLVU-FM
KMHD-FM HD2
KPDQ-AM
KKSN-AM

News Talk Information
Contemporary Christian
Variety
Mexican Regional
Contemporary Christian
Alternative
Religious
Alternative

0.2
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.2
*
0.2
*

0.3
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.1
*
0.2
0.1

0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1

Data unavailable:
*

KBNP-AM

News Talk Information

0.1

*

*

*
*
*

KKOV-AM
KRYN-AM
KXL-FM

Adult Standards/MOR
Spanish News/Talk
News Talk Information

2.3
0.2
2.4

1.4
*
*

*
*
*

* Data
are nothttp://www.arbitron.com/radio_stations/home.htm
available for this station/survey.
Source:

accessed July 7, 2011

PPM ratings are based on audience estimates and are the opinion of
Arbitron and should not be relied on for precise accuracy or precise
representativeness of a demographic or radio market.
© 2005-2011 Arbitron Inc. All Rights Reserved. Arbitron's radio audience estimates and data are federally
copyrighted by and proprietary to Arbitron Inc. All Arbitron data are protected under U.S. copyright law, state
misappropriation law, and other state and federal laws. Violations of Arbitron's rights under U.S. copyright law
may result in statutory damages per act of infringement and the recovery of Arbitron's attorneys' fees required to
enforce Arbitron's rights, in addition to other rights and remedies under other applicable laws, such as the
Lanham Act.
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PPM™ is a mark of Arbitron Inc. Media Rating Council ® is a registered trademark of the Media Rating Council.

Appendix D
Portland, OR Top 12 by Rank, Format, Owner 1996-97
Rank

Station

Format

Owner

1

KKRZ FM

CHR

Jacor

2

KKCW FM

AC

Jacor

3

KWJJ FM

Country

Fisher

4

KXL AM

NTI

Alexander

5

KUPL FM

Country

Amer. Radio Systems

6

KEX AM

NTI

Jacor

7

KKSN FM

Oldies

Sinclair

8

KUFO FM

AOR

Amer. Radio Systems

9

KGON FM

Classic Rock

Entercom

10

KNRK FM

New Rock

Entercom

11

KINK FM

AAA

EXCL

12

KKJZ FM

Smooth Jazz

Amer. Radio Systems

CHR: Contemporary Hit Radio
AC: Adult Contemporary
NTI: News Talk Info
AOR: Album Oriented Rock
AAA: Adult Album Alternative

Note: This excludes public station OPB; no ratings data available for 1996-97.
Source: Arbitron Archives, Hargrett Rare Book & Manuscript Library, U. of Georgia.
http://www.libs.uga.edu/hargrett/index.shtml
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Appendix E
Portland, OR
Rank

Top 12 by Rank, Format, Owner, 2011

Station

Format

Owner

1

KKCW FM

AC

Clear Channel

2

KOPB FM*

News/Talk

PUBLIC

3

KLTH FM

Classic Hits

Clear Channel

4

KKRZ FM

CHR

Clear Channel

5

KUPL FM

Country

Alpha

6

KFBW FM

Classic Rock

Clear Channel

6

KGON FM

Classic Rock

Entercom

8

KXJM FM

Rhythmic CHR

Clear Channel

9

KINK FM

AAA

Alpha

10

KWJJ FM

Country

Entercom

11

KYCH FM

Variety Hits

Entercom

12

KEX AM

News/Talk

Clear Channel

13

KNRK FM

AAA

Entercom

CHR: Contemporary Hit Radio
AC: Adult Contemporary
AOR: Album Oriented Rock
AAA: Adult Album Alternative
*Note: Because my subject is commercial radio, I do not count public station KOPB.
Source: Arbitron http://www.arbitron.com/home/content.stm accessed June, 10, 2011
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Appendix F
Radio Survey 2011
*Note that responses are in red*
1. As part of my master’s thesis at PSU concerning media policy, I am conducting this
survey of broadcast news professionals who worked in Portland radio between 1986 and
today.
Does this describe you? YES = 17 (Negative responses to this question were omitted)
2. Please specify which years (between 1986 and 2011) you worked as a radio
professional in Portland.
Of 17 respondents, all were employed during some years between 1986 – 2011.
Min
Max
Mean

4
25
17.6875

3. In your opinion, what are the most important roles local radio should play in a
community?
Respondents:
1. Radio has the ability to inform listeners of news and events
immediately. Although t.v. is changing, radio is still much more mobile
and easier to accomplish. And unlike the internet, it is more genial.
Someone is communicating with you. You are a listener just as you listen
to a storyteller around the campfire.
2. Conveying timely and essential information to a large audience,
particularly during times of emergency. Elevating awareness of local
issues, problems, opportunities, and solutions. Providing an opportunity
for diverse voices to be heard. Enhancing the community’s self-awareness
and sense of place. All within the context of the station’s mission of
reaching a target audience and, for commercial stations, succeeding as a
business.
3. (no response)
4. If there is any credence to the idea that the airwaves are public, a local
radio operation receives a license to broadcast as a sort of “permission
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slip” to utilize a certain frequency on behalf of the people who truly own it
– the public. Under the rubrics of this baseline truism, therefore, such
stations are obligated to serve their public. Certainly, as a business, they
must make a profit, but they must also devote a measurable (and
considerable) amount of time to public services – announcements,
programming, and news – with the sole purpose of informing and
elevating public discourse. In this sense, local radio stations have a moral
and ethical responsibility to act as “vox populi.”
5. (no response)
6. To provide the fastest information to the public in the event of
emergency or crisis. To provide the most up-to-date information on
weather and traffic conditions for commuters. To bring the rest of the
world to listeners' doorsteps.
7. Covering local news and issues, giving voices to people who might not
otherwise be heard, giving local perspective on national and international
issues.
8. 1) Fostering a sense of “community;” involvement with local issues,
local needs, the local arts communities and charities; Those stations that
provide music (AKA entertainment) have a responsibility to play to the
demographics of their home community. 2) Give to the community, rather
than squeeze the local audience and businesses for more dollars. 3)
Provide creative programming, appropriate for community served. In
other words, do not talk down or target lowest common denominator.
Radio should help build the overall “creativity” of its home community.
9. 1.local news and information - done by trained professionals 2.public
affairs programming that is produced locally; that addresses issues of
public importance 3.entertainment that is compelling; locally orginated is
a must for significant portion of the day 4.great local programming helps
to define a place and give people a sense of place
10. Provide a wide range of news and information to our audience,
including community events, arts and culture. Create unique
programming for our local community.
11. Radio has the ability to connect to the individual listener to both
inform and entertain. To maintain an audience, the information needs to
be entertaining. Radio has the ability to pass along local news and issues
while getting the audience to interact with those topics. This can apply to
music and information based radio stations. Radio should play a vital role
as a conduit to broadcast information to the general public. Emergency
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information is important during a crisis. Community news and issues are
important on a daily basis.
12. Providing timely and accurate news and information.
13. Local commercial radio provides the community with the fastest most
accurate information in the event of a large-scale emergency. Be it fire,
volcanic eruption, earthquake, tsunami or a simple traffic tie-up, most
people turn to radio first, which is appropriate.
14. It depends on the community. In Cannon Beach it should provide
essential information on a real-time basis. In Portland there is a
community of communities. We're a fragmented urban society so there is
a multitude of roles for radio to play. If it hopes to survive in a free
market environment, it's primary role is to attract enough listeners to make
a profit and stay in business. Unless it's a philanthropic endeavor.
15. The role of local radio news should be to ascertain the most pressing
issues and needs of a community and address them with thoughtful,
timely, and balanced programming as well keeping on top of breaking
local, national, and international news.
16. News radio should be a reflection of the community. It should
provide a voice for the public. It should answer questions about what
people are seeing in their communities. If there’s smoke in the sky, if
there’s a traffic back up, we should tell listeners why. If there is a
controversial topic, we should present both sides without drawing
conclusions.
17. To inform citizens of breaking news in their communities, covering a
broad spectrum of topics (political decisions, business news such as
layoffs, natural/manmade disasters). Even with all the new media out
there, I still think radio is the best source for fast-breaking news. To serve
as a universally-accessible forum for disseminating ideas, encouraging
public debate, and highlighting the cultural life an unique identity of a
community through interviews, broadcast community events, editorials,
live performances and call-in programs.
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4. As you see it, in terms of providing the public with an adequate source of local
news/public affairs, Portland stations offer:

Too much
Right amount
Not enough

0
2
14

5. In your professional estimation, have local stations increased, maintained, or reduced
the amount of local news/public affairs in recent years?

Increased
Maintained
Reduced

0
1
16

6. Some studies suggest less time is now being allocated for local news/public affairs on
local radio. Do you think this is the case?
Yes
No

15
1

7. If yes, which of the following are reasons you think stations have reduced such
programming? (Please rate on a scale of 1 – 10. 1 = Non-reason, 10 = Major Reason.)
Responses are tabulated below, in figures 7a – 7d, followed by volunteered responses to
e, “other.”
a. Ownership efforts to reduce cost
b. Buy-outs by larger media companies
c. Audiences prefer non-news (entertainment)
d. People can get local news elsewhere (TV, Internet,
etc.)
e. Other (please specify):
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Figure 7a

Figure 7b
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Figure 7c

Figure 7d
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7e. Respondents who marked “other” offered the following as additional possible factors
in the reduction of local news/public affairs on local commercial radio. (Listed here by
respondent number.)
1. I think it’s the popularity of talk radio that’s reduced news programming. Many
would call talk radio ‘news and public affairs’ and so they’d differ with my
opinion.
2. Information is now fully a part of programming. If it increases audience

share, it’s there. If not, it’s gone.
4. FCC deregulation has led to radio stations having no incentive to serve the public.
Financial gain has become the only reason such stations exist today.
11. Music stations have reduced news and increased music to compete with music
players, internet radio and other sources.
15. Lack of imagination.
Questions 8 – 14. Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following
statements: (On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1=Strongly disagree, 5=neutral, 10=strongly
agree) Responses are tabulated below, in figures 8 – 14.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Radio is just like any other business, and should be able to profit in
the same way as any other business.
Because it uses public airwaves, radio is different from other
businesses.
I think we have plenty of choices for local news/public affairs news
on the radio.
Except for public broadcasting, local radio
reporting on important public issues is pretty limited
Radio programming should not be regulated. The public interest
should be determined only by ratings (how popular a program or
station is).
Radio stations should be required to air some programs that reflect
local concerns.
As a broadcast journalist, I feel my ability to communicate
important news subjects to my listening audience is limited in the
current media environment.
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Figure 8

Figure 9
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Figure 10

Figure 11
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Figure 12

Figure 13
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Figure 14

15. As an on-air radio employee, are/were your news/public affairs stories shared more
with another station(s) in recent years?
Yes: 11
No: 5
16. As a staff member (on or off the air) do/did you use more shared content (produced
elsewhere in your company or parent company) in recent years?
Yes: 12
No: 3
17. What are your thoughts on the public service responsibilities of local radio?
(Responses are listed in red below, by respondent number. Note that station names were
omitted if they risked revealing the respondent’s identity.)
1. Response: I am an avid NPR listener now. I rarely tune in to another
station anymore – because I just prefer to stick with the reliability of NPR
and I don’t really have the time to test out or muddle though other stations.
I worked for K___ and thought they were very good and they probably
still are but there’s a lot to sit through and I am pretty much a car listener
only I don’t want to sit through commercials or “stuff” when I have such a
limited amount of listening time. That’s true for K___ as well where I
also worked. (Those are the only two stations where I worked. I think we
did a great job at both places and I loved what i/we put on the air. I should
say also as an employee of K___, I also did weekend radio hits for K___
since they were our news partner for a while.) I am attracted to radio
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stations that do a good job with news and public affairs, but I also believe
in free enterprise and with everything else out there, I’m not sure it’s
realistic to regulate radio anymore.
2. Smart broadcasters, like any business, understand that they benefit by
playing a role in the community beyond squeezing out the greatest
possible profit. Successful commercial stations are run by local
management and staff who care about the community they live in. When a
top-rated morning show raises awareness and then delivers a large turnout
to a fundraising event for an important cause, it’s not because they’re
required to by regulation. I’ve seen for decades how regulatory
requirements usually result in only a minimal level of community service
programming. And if stations were required to present x amount of PA
programming, it seems very plain that staff won’t be added--the duty will
be assigned to one of the few remaining employees who’ve survived
budget cuts, and they’ll be spread thinner yet.
3. (no response)
4. Deregulation has created the McDonald-ization of modern broadcasting.
This trend, which began to appear increasingly in the 1970s with the birth
of the broadcast consulting industry, has ossified completely over the past
three decades with the takeover of the airwaves by a handful of large
corporations. What once required literate, erudite, thoughtful and
relatively objective programmers and news departments has been
desiccated into an almost lifeless husk of banality. Vital, lively and
stimulating examination of local issues is the a priori responsibility of
every local broadcaster, and this has simply disappeared from the
broadcasting lexicon. Issues that literally speak to the heart of a society’s
ability to survive, much less prosper – its educational system, forms of
politics and governance, environmental concerns, to name but a few – are
apparently now considered too boring or complex for local media to
address. A syndrome has evolved in which the public, long denied civil
discourse and the catalyst for thoughtful introspection, has increasingly
become accustomed to a broadcast diet of intellectual pablum. This, in
turn, creates the perception among station owners that this is what the
public really desires. Content is diluted further still, and the end result is
“news” and public affairs programming barely recognizable as such. Were
he alive to witness it, Edward R. Murrow would be in agony.
5. Public services messages, in short form, are no longer run on stations
that I know of unless there’s some kind of commercial buy included either
by the charity or a big name sponsor. There are private charity events that
all stations get involved in within a calendar year, but it seems mostly
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about what other sponsors get involved or how big the event is so the
station can make an impression in the community. It’s as though the
marketing of a station has become what charity event can we be seen
doing in front of the most people. Nothing wrong with that, but the
smaller charities, and little events pretty much are ignored, or put on an
event list on a website. Station ratings in the world of PPM* are split
within such a narrow margin in any demographic, that the trend has been
to not talk much, play more music, and hope for the best. Then you have
the all talk stations, which are also entertainment, and not balanced in
terms of political slant. This hasn’t done anyone any good. Fair and
balanced presentation of issues is the only way to make responsible
decisions. I think it’s just good radio to be involved with the community,
and all the events, music, festivals, and fundraisers that are important to
the audience. It’s too bad that it takes regulation to make most stations do
the right thing. Running the same local PSA show on a cluster of stations
early in the morning on Sunday, isn’t really serving the community.
*PPM refers to Portable People Meter, an Arbitron ratings device worn by
research volunteers to measure time spent listening. (See Appendix H.)
6. I believe radio stations should be required to air a certain number of
hours to public service programming. If it is not required, as history has
shown us, it simply won't be done.
7. Because they use public resources they need to be more accountable to
the public—not in what they say but in what they cover. I am a dinosaur. I
believe in the fairness doctrine, I believe in children's content, I believe in
specifying a certain amount of local content. I think that makes me a
commie pinko fascist Nazi. So be it.
8. At the last “cluster” of stations I worked for, I was given carte blanche
to cover local issues in an absolutely nonpartisan manner. i.e. both sides of
issues, particularly during election coverage. The company that purchased
most of these stations only provides public service programs that reflect its
partisan mission. This is absolutely counter to the very few public service
requirements that remain. The FCC has gutted public service mandates
because a handful of big corporations own almost all the radio stations in
the country. Consequently, the FCC serves these big corporations rather
than the public. There is, quite frankly, nothing on the commercial
airwaves in the greater Portland area that lives up to the “service” in
public service. Only OPB and KBOO offer any balanced coverage, and
KBOO leans toward the left. Public service and news should help
listeners participate in our cherished free and open society… bring them
into the “process” of democracy, so to speak; and help them make
informed decisions in all areas of political and community discourse. The
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current state of public service on-air in Portland suggests that 1) only
entertainment is important and 2) that a station should indoctrinate
listeners to its political agenda.
9. 1.Radio has unique story-telling capability, with a one-on-one, personal
touch. People say, “that’s my radio station.” Whereas, you don’t hear
people say, “Channel 8, that’s my favorite TV station.” Same for
newspaper. Nothing connects to the degree that radio can. 2.Given
radio’s story-telling capability and highly personalized connectivity, radio
has an obligation to create MEANINGFUL and INSIGHTFUL news and
public service programs. Otherwise, it’s a waste of a tremendous
resource. 3.It’s interesting that KOPB, which has one of the largest weekly
cume* numbers in the market, produces the best public service and news
programming. 4.Commercial broadcasters are missing out on the
opportunity for bigger ratings and profits by abdicating their responsibility
to have better news and public affairs programming.
Note: “Cume” refers to Arbitron’s estimation as to how many unique
listeners (among target groups) are tuned in during a given period of time
for at least five minutes.
10. Local media resources have been drastically reduced since the
deregulation of radio. The consolidation of radio resulted in drastic staff
reductions and eliminated quality local. The station I have worked at for
23 years went from a thriving local business that provided above average
wages and excellent benefits to its staff to a corporate cash cow in a matter
of a few brief years. Today, our main focus is increasing revenue and
keeping investors happy. We are often reminded that we all work for the
sales department.
11. Radio needs to serve the local community, as such it has the
responsibility to provide information that meets the needs of the
community. The product must attract an audience, because without
listeners, what good is the information? Public service responsibilities can
be met in many ways, but the variety of issues must be diverse. It
includes, but is not limited to, local government, schools, community
groups and efforts, emergency preparation and emergency coverage.
Radio has the responsibility to bring into the community discussion of
issues that might normally be ignored.
12. Radio stations are licensed to use the airwaves by the federal
government. Because of that, they should allocate a percentage of their
broadcast day to serve the public interest with topical news and
information.
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13. I think there is too little emphasis/caring about the public service
responsibilities. But the lack of content and time devoted reflects that the
BUSINESS of radio is dollar-driven. I work at the Alpha Broadcasting
radio cluster and we are (arguably) the front-running servers of need-toknow information. On a daily basis we seek out informed experts to tell
our audience what is happening behind the scenes of public events. When
we believe the public needs to know WHY someone/something is
happening as it is, we try very hard to find someone with insight. We hold
at least three meetings a day to discuss story ideas and possible approaches
to stories, I expect we are unique in that regard. I believe that our news
product is on a par with any station in the country and THAT is what a
radio station should strive to achieve. Otherwise it is just a purveyor of
advertising without the content that the listeners deserve from a station
granted access to the airwaves.
14. Mandating public service programming content is appropriate as the
price broadcasters must pay for a piece of the spectrum of the public air
wave spectrum. Controlling said content is not. Based on my own
experience, the most well-intentioned public service programming will
remain relegated to the off hours on non-public broadcasting stations
unless broadcasters figure out a way to make it entertaining. Doing so is
extremely difficult if not impossible. People mostly turn on the radio to be
entertained and informed, not to become better citizens.
15. See answer to question 3.
16. News radio has a better opportunity than music radio to address public
service responsibilities through our news content. However, with limited
staffing, more quick and frequent newscasts, and growing responsibilities
on our websites, it is increasingly difficult to really dig into topics. Aside
from that, we must do our best to reflect public issues in the community.
Mandating this as part of a radio license is an effective way to do this.
17. The airwaves belong to the public. Radio stations (commercial and
public) have them on loan from us. I do not object to radio station owners
making a profit from the public airwaves (any more than I object to
trucking companies profiting because they use public highways). Even
public radio has to make a “profit” to remain solvent”. But I do think
being allowed to profit from the public airwaves implies some
responsibility for using some of that airtime to inform/educate the public
about local issues/concerns. In an era of shrinking ad revenues and an
explosion of media choices, I think a good deal of this responsibility has
been cast aside in the struggle to keep radio stations alive as businesses. I
don't know how to fix that. But I think whatever the business climate,
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radio stations need (even in a limited way) to be part of the public life of
their communities through their newscasts, interview programs, and
broadcast public forums.
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The Spike in Acquisitions
We use the term “acquisitions” to refer to the number of radio stations changing hands
Appendix G
through purchase, merger, swap, or other transfer, in a given year.4 Acquisitions measure
economic activity in the market
for radio stations. They do not measure consolidation per se,
Spike in Acquisitions – Radio Stations Nationwide
but do suggest how quickly it has happened. Chart 3-2 plots the number of acquisitions per
5
year
over the last
two
decades.
Acquisitions
= The
number
of radio stations changing hands through purchase, merger, swap, or other
transfer in a given year.

Chart 3-2: Acquisitions of Radio Stations
1982-2002
Shown:
1982 - 2002
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A considerable increase in station acquisitions occurred
following the 1996 Telecommunications Act.

A considerable increase in station acquisitions occurred in 1996 following passage of the
Telecommunications Act. The plot also shows the effect of Congress relaxing the cap on
nationwide ownership in years prior to 1996 before removing it altogether in 1996. The
increase in acquisitions beginning in 1986-1987 demonstrates the effect of gradual
deregulation in the late 1980s.
4

We calculate acquisitions at the station level. To illustrate: if one station is sold to a new owner, we count this
as one acquisition. If a company owning five stations merges with a larger company (the surviving entity), this
counts as five acquisitions. Thus, one transaction could count as more than one acquisition, depending on the
number of stations involved. Our choice to use station level data maintains consistency throughout this study
and keeps the focus on the communities of consumers, employees, and firms surrounding each station.

Source:
DiCola
Thomson
2002,
p. 20 Networks, data as of May 16, 2002. We report a pair of caveats
Source
data:
Mediaand
Access
Pro, BIA
Financial
about BIA’s historical acquisition data. First, BIA does not guarantee that each station’s transaction history is
complete. While some transactions going back to the 1920s are captured in BIA’s database, there may remain
an undercollection problem for data previous to the late 1980s. Second, a maximum of eight historical
transactions per station are maintained in the database. Only a handful of stations in the nationwide database hit
this limit, so this seems unlikely to skew our results in Chart 3-1.
5
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Appendix H

Portable People Meter
According to Arbitron’s “Guide to Understanding and using PPM Data,” available at the
Arbitron website:

Introduction
The Portable People Meter™ service
introduces a whole new era in radio ratings.
It not only replaces paper and pencil diaries
with electronic measurement, it also
introduces new concepts and terms in
audience measurement.
For example, the word “station” no longer
refers to just what is being broadcast on the
AM or FM radio dial. In the PPM™ service,
“station” can also refer to digital broadcasts,
including HD Radio®, HD multicasts and
Internet streams.

This guide introduces our radio and agency
clients
to this
vocabulary
and provides
A PPM is a pager-like device
worn
by new
research
volunteers
(“panelists”), which picks up
an
overview
of
how
the
PPM
data
can be
“unique inaudible codes” embedded in audio signals emitted
by broadcast and Internet
used. PPM terms and concepts are clustered
streams (from online radio stations).
together to provide a framework of how they
relate and work together. An index is provided
to help you quickly find specific words.
As an introductory overview, this guide
should never be used in place of the PPM
Description of Methodology (DOM). The
DOM contains the most thorough and
up-to-date information available about
the PPM service, and you are urged to
refer to it frequently. It is available to
Source: Arbitron http://www.arbitron.com/portable_people_meters/home.htm
PPM subscribers at www.arbitron.com.

Note: Arbitron data has previously aggregated data for people 12 years and older shown in ratings data as
“12+” although, since 2007, the service has expanded to include six-year-olds, so that much Arbitron data
is now expressed as “6+.” Per Arbitron spokesman, personal email.

Table of Contents

Basic PPM Vocabulary......................................1
Audience Estimates ..........................................7
Buying and Selling .........................................12
Survey Research ..............................................15
Measuring the Performance
of the Survey ....................................................16
Index of Terms .................................................20
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Appendix I
Employee Data per SEC Filings
Clear Channel
Clear Channel had 2,377 radio employees and 86 radio stations in 1996, per SEC 10-K
filing for fiscal year 1996, filed March 31, 1997. Dividing the number of employees by
the number of stations, I found a per-station employee average of 27.6.
Source: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/739708/0000739708-97-000006.txt;

Because of business reorganization, federal filings no longer break out radio employees.
So, to determine the number of radio employees, I accessed:
CC Outdoor (Clear Channel’s Outdoor Billboard and Advertising business)
SEC 10-K data, found at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1334978/000119312510058241/d10k.htm
as of March 10, 2010, had 1,996 US billboard/advertising employees.

I also accessed Clear Channel Communications (including broadcast and
billboard/advertising operations) shows 14,980 domestic employees and 894 radio
stations.
SEC 10-K data, fiscal year 2009, found at:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/739708/000119312510058288/d10k.htm

By subtracting the number of billboard/advertising workers (1,996) from the total number
of Clear Channel domestic workers (14,980), I determined the company had 12,984 radio
employees in 2009.
14,980
- 1,996
= 12,984 radio employees 2009

Dividing the number of broadcast employees (12,984) by the number of stations (894), I
found the per-station average number of employees for 2009 was 14.5.
Entercom
Entercom employed 684 full-time and 250 part-time workers in 1998 (the oldest year for
which SEC data was available), per SEC S-1 filing Aug. 13, 1998. With 41 stations,
Entercom employed an average of 16.68 full-time and 6.1 part-time workers.
Source: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067837/0000893220-98-001351.txt
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In November 2009, SEC data shows Entercom with 110 stations, 1,560 full-time, and 750
part-time workers, a per-station average of 14.18 full-time and 6.8 part-time employees.
Source: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067837/000110465910014263/a09-35761_110k.htm
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Appendix J – KGON
News, Public Affair, PSAs 1998, 2011
News
KGON news calculations – National News 1998
News during Morning Show, between 5:00 – 10:00 AM weekdays: National news = 60
seconds per hour x 5 hours = 300 seconds (5 min.) per day. 5 x 5 days = 25 national news
minutes per week x 13 weeks = 325 min. per quarter.
Local News 1998
Local news =180 seconds per hour x 5 hours = 900 seconds (15 min.) per day.
15 x 5 days = 75 local news minutes per week x 13 weeks = 975 min. per quarter.
National News 2011
News during Morning Show, between 5:00 – 10:00 AM weekdays: From Los Angeles =
105 seconds per hour x 5 hours = 525 seconds (8.75 min.) per day.
8.75 x 5 days = 43.75 national news minutes per week x 13 weeks = 569 min. per quarter.
Local News 2011
No local news is presented, aside from occasional traffic and weather announcements.
Public Affairs
KGON public affairs calculations – National Public Affairs 1998
Conversation, a 60 min. national public affairs program ran at 5:00 AM Sunday
mornings. 60 x 13 weeks = 780 min. national public affairs min. quarterly.
Local PA 1998
KGON presented a one-hour local public affairs program, Metroscope, at 6:00 AM
Sundays mornings. 60 min. x 13 weeks = 780 min. local PA.
National PA 2011
KGON presented two nationally syndicated public affairs shows, Viewpoint and Radio
Health Journal, 7:00 – 8:00 AM, Sundays. Each program ran an average of 25 min. = 50
min. per week x 13 weeks = 650 min. national public affairs programming per quarter.
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Local PA 2011
KGON presented a local public affairs program, Metroscope, which ran weekly, 6:00 –
7:00 AM, Sundays. Each program ran 50 min. x 13 weeks = 650 local public affairs min.
per quarter.
Public Service Announcements
National PSAs 1998
Multiple PSAs ran, daytime (5:00 AM – 11:00 PM) = 2.25 min. per quarter.
Multiple PSAs ran nighttime (11:00 PM – 5:00 AM) = 99 min. per quarter.
Local PSAs 1998
Multiple PSAs ran – all daytime = 7.83 min. per quarter. See samples, next page.**
National PSAs 2011
KGON’s treatment of public service announcements has changed. For 2011, rather than
numerous, brief PSAs, the station focuses promotional announcements around fewer,
usually larger, station-sponsored events. “So, in terms of the old school :15 or :30
[second] PSA, those are long gone. Now, they are promoting an event around a charity. I
think we have that covered in the Marketing and Traffic departments” (personal email).
Such events are sometimes, but not always, linked to local business sponsors.
For the first quarter of 2011, for example, KGON conducted a March of Dimes
promotion, with 50 on-air “mentions.”
Local PSAs 2011
As with national PSAs, KGON’s local public service now revolves around specific
charitable events—some sponsored by local businesses; others, championed by individual
station employees. “Rock’tion,” a benefit for a girls music camp, for example, was a key
event during the 2011 first quarter, with 60 on-air mentions.
Source: http://blogs.kgon.com/irisharrison/2009/09/02/the-history-of-kgona-work-in-progress/ and personal
emails with current or former KGON staff.
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Local PSA samples, 1998:

Source: KGON station public file, viewed April 15, 2011.
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Appendix K – KWJJ
News, Public Affair, PSAs 1998, 2011
News
National News 1998
News during Morning Show: estimated at approximately three minutes on the hour and
half-hour between 5:00 – 9:00 (nine newscasts), for a total of 27 min. of news per
morning, of which about 9:00 minutes was national. For the week, 45 min. of national
news x 13 weeks = 585 minutes per quarter.
Local News 1998
Each newscast contained another estimated two minutes of local news, for 18 min. local
news per morning, or 90 min. per week. 90 x 13 weeks = 1,170 min. local news quarterly.
National News 2011
Both number and length of newscast were lower in 2011. Newscasts were estimated at
one minute, twice per hour for three hours, 6:00 – 9:00 AM, for a total of seven minutes
daily, or 35 min. per week. Of that, an estimated 25 percent focused on national news,
8.75 min. per week x 13 weeks = 113.75 min. per quarter.
Local News 2011
Since 75 percent of the remaining news minutes were local = 26.25 min. per week x 13
weeks = 341.25 min. local news minutes per week.
Public Affairs
National Public Affairs 1998
KWJJ’s public affairs programming was local in 1998.
Local PA 1998
KWJJ offered a 30 minute local public affairs show, Metro Magazine, Sundays, 5:30
AM. 30 min. x 13 weeks = 390.
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National PA 2011
KWJJ presented two nationally syndicated public affairs shows, Viewpoint and Radio
Health Journal, the same shows that were aired on KGON. Instead of early Sunday
morning (KGON), they ran on Sunday nights (KWJJ), 11:00 – Midnight. Each program
ran an average of 25 min. = 50 min. per week x 13 weeks = 650 min. national public
affairs programming per quarter.
Local PA 2011
KWJJ presented a local public affairs program, Metroscope, the same program aired on
KGON. Again, instead of a Sunday morning schedule (KGON), Metroscope ran weekly,
10:00 – 11:00 PM, Sundays. Each program ran 50 min. x 13 weeks = 650 local public
affairs min. per quarter.
Public Service Announcements
National PSAs 1998
KWJJ’s were generally local.
Local PSAs 1998
KWJJ ran an average of seven 20-second PSAs per weekday morning = 140 sec. per day
x 5 days each week = 700 sec. (1.6 min.) per week x 13 weeks = 151.6 PSA min. per
quarter. See PSA samples next page.**
National PSAs 2011
If events listed for 2011, first quarter, are typical, KWJJ’s PSAs are generally local.
Local PSAs 2011
Like KGON, KWJJ’s local public service now revolves around specific charitable
events—some sponsored by local businesses; others, championed by individual station
employees. For example, for Q1 2011, the station gave 25 on-air announcements for a
local benefit concert, and additional announcements promoting a benefit running event.
See sample next page.**
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KWJJ Sample PSAs – Compare:
1998: 3 days

2011: 91 days

Source: KWJJ Public Files, viewed April 15, 2011.
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Appendix L
KOPB Radio Ratings 1997 – 2009

As shown here, KOPB’s market ranking hovered around 10th place in the late 1990s. It
jumped up in the ratings in 2001, where it remained consistently in the first or second
position.
Source: Radio Research Consortium, www. RRConline.org
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Appendix M
Shared Public Affairs Programs on Portland Radio
(Sundays, First Quarter, 2011)

Metroscope

Viewpoints

Radio Health Journal Sunday Magazine

Entercom Stations
KFXX 1080
KNRK 94.7
KWJJ 99.5
KYCH 97.1
KRSK 105.1
KGON 92.3

10:00 PM
6:00 AM
10:00 PM
7:00 AM
7:00 AM
6:00 AM

11:00 PM
7:00 AM
11:00 PM
6:30 AM
10:00 PM
7:30 AM

11:30 PM
7:30 AM
11:30 PM
6:00 AM
10:30 PM
7:00 AM

-----10:30 PM
7:30 AM
7:30 AM
7:30 AM

----------------

-------------------

Clear Channel Stations
KKRZ 100.3
KKCW 103.3
KFBW 105.9
KLTH 106.7
KXJM 107.5

----------------

7:00 AM
10:00 PM
7:00 AM
7:00 AM
7:00 AM

As shown, numerous stations from both Entercom and Clear Channel often ran the same
public affairs programs, with the same subject matter—sometimes at the very same time.
When duplicate content ran at precisely the same time on multiple stations, it is
highlighted here in red. Three Clear Channel stations and one Entercom station, for
example, are all broadcasting the same material, nationally syndicated Viewpoints, at 7:30
Sunday mornings. And Sunday Magazine, a local program, runs at the same time, 7:00
AM Sundays, on four Clear Channel stations.
Source: Station Public Files
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